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In 2006, the German federal government relinquished its power to determine store 
opening hours to the 16 federal states. Since then, substantial deregulation of shopping hours 
has occurred in all states except Bavaria and Saarland. Such deregulation could support 
economic growth, but it has been argued to hurt small businesses.  
Therefore, this thesis examines different store size categories to find possible effects of 
deregulation in Germany. Past studies have focused on the employment effects of 
deregulation, whereas this investigation employs a difference-in-difference approach with OLS 
regression on the number of stores in each size category. States that have extended store 
opening hours will be compared to those that have not. Theory predicts large stores to be more 
able to profit from efficiency gains and higher returns on investment due to extended hours. 
The results did not support the theoretical framework. Instead, the data indicate no 
significant effects on the number of stores and suggest that the constraints are not binding. 
Small businesses do not appear to have been affected by the change. If deregulation can be 
found to increase consumer spending and welfare, then such a policy change can have positive 
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The retail sector is vital to the economy, employing approximately 10% of the workforce 
in industrialized economies (Schivardi and Viviano, 2011, p. 145). However, the retail 
experience of the average consumer is quite different depending on where the shopping 
occurs. It is common to see stores serving customers 24 hours a day in the U.S. In contrast, for 
some European consumers, retail shopping ends at 9pm on weekdays and is almost impossible 
on Sundays. Some governments restrict store opening hours and/or days, affecting consumers’ 
and retailers’ choices. Recently, however, others have removed or reduced regulations, as is 
the case with Germany. 
 Deregulation of shopping times could affect the retail sectors of these economies. 
When such restrictions are lifted, theory suggests that larger stores can better compete and 
possibly even benefit from longer hours; as a result, their share of the retail market should 
increase. One such impact could be the higher concentration of hypermarkets and large 
supermarkets in countries that have deregulated.  Opening hour restrictions are often designed 
to specifically protect smaller, traditional stores, which cannot afford the additional labor and 
operating costs associated with longer hours. Protecting smaller, sometimes family-owned, 
businesses often becomes an important political objective for governments. Yet in the face of 
sluggish economic growth in Europe and international pressure to deregulate hours, it is worth 
reexamining whether these potential negative effects on small businesses can be substantiated.  
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If not, then countries could deregulate since this may increase economic activity with little or 
no downside.  
I will examine the effects of deregulation on store concentration and entry/ exit, for 
smaller and larger retail stores. Germany provides a kind of natural experiment, as deregulation 
occurred at different times in each state. Thus, German data from the period 2002-2011 will be 
studied to detect possible changes in the states’ retail sectors resulting from widespread 
deregulation in 2006 and 2007. The empirical evidence regarding the effect of retail store 
opening time regulation, described in detail in the Results section of this thesis, shows no 






Regulation of Shopping Hours 
Overview of Shopping Regulation. Shopping regulations, such as limited opening 
hours, can be imposed by local, regional, or national governments on retail businesses of 
varying sizes and thereby limit the commercial activities of businesses. Besides restricting 
hours, governments may also limit business location and store size, as is the case in Ireland, 
Norway, and some American cities, like San Francisco (Institute for Local Self-Reliance, 2012). In 
Germany, the Baunutzungsverordnung legislation effectively protects medium-sized retailers 
and discount stores by prescribing a maximum floor area of 1,200 square meters, allowing for 
retail space of 700 square meters (Kalhan and Franz, 2009, p. 63).  
Governments can restrict the days (typically weekends) or hours (usually early morning 
or late evening) that stores can open for customers. When a store closes for one or more days, 
this often results in higher costs, such as spoiled food, than opening later or closing earlier. 
Note that a store opening regulation serves as a kind of upper bound on store behavior; stores 
may be open during the government-prescribed times, but they could still choose to remain 
closed during the additional hours for economic reasons or personal choice.  
Shopping Deregulation in Europe. In Europe, store opening-hour regulation is still a 
widespread phenomenon. As of 2013, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain (regionally), and 
the United Kingdom continue to have legislation restricting retail opening hours. However, the 
following nations have completely unrestricted hours: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
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Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Sweden, and Turkey (EuroCommerce). Beyond Europe, some Australian states and Canadian 
provinces and municipalities still restrict shopping hours, for instance (Australian Government 
Productivity Commission, 2011 and Skuterud, 2005), so this type of regulation is not only found 
in Europe. 
Germany’s laws and other restrictive legislation should be viewed in the following 
context: Europeans are comparatively more concerned about producer interests and consumer 
(or rather, worker) protection, whereas Americans care more about consumer economic 
interests (namely, a wide variety of goods and longer store hours) and consumer sovereignty 
(Whitman, 2007, pp. 383-384). Nevertheless, such regulations are being progressively scaled 
back throughout Europe. 
Some European nations, like Sweden, lifted their regulations many years ago, providing 
a comparison to those that still regulate or have only recently deregulated. Sweden, after 
expanding retail hours in 1948 and 1967, fully removed all store opening hour restrictions in 
1972. Denmark only recently deregulated, but it did so gradually but uniformly from 1995 to 
2012. As in Sweden, the deregulation process ended in store hours being completely 
deregulated.  
Shopping Deregulation in Germany.  This thesis focuses on the deregulation 
experience in Germany, which has been a gradual process. In Germany shopping days were 
determined by the Ladenschlussgesetz (“Store closing law”) from 1956 to 2006. Although it was 
5 
  
revised several times, the last major changes came in 1996, when stores were allowed to open 
from 6 am to 8 pm Monday-Friday and Saturday until 4 pm, and in 2003, when Saturday 
opening hours were changed to 8 pm as well. Since 2006, however, federal states now have the 
power to determine shop opening hours. The Ladenschlussgesetz is only still in place in Bavaria. 
All other federal states deregulated opening hours in 2006 and 2007. When one state 
deregulated shopping hours, this probably induced its neighbors to deregulate as well to avoid 
losing customers to cross-border shopping. 
Unlike in many countries, shopping deregulation in Germany occurred at different 
times, when legislation was passed in each state, as can be seen in Appendix Table A1, which 
summarizes Tables 5 and 6 in Reddy (2012, p.53-54). The exact dates that deregulation laws 
went in force are noted. For simplicity, those that occurred after June 30 were rounded up to 
the next year; the change happened so late in the year that its effect on businesses would not 
likely be seen until the following year.   
The yearly opening hours by state are also listed. Bavaria and Saarland made no (or 
minimal) changes to their opening hours; thus, their total opening hours are the lowest. While 
all other states have at least 7000 legal yearly opening hours, Rhineland-Palatinate and Saxony 
have significantly less, 4856 and 5865 hours respectively. Most states allow stores to open 24 
hours a day Mondays-Saturdays; in addition, they allow for opening on select Sundays each 
year for a certain number of hours. There is some year-to-year variation in the number of 
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opening hours based on the different holidays celebrated in each state, which may fall on 
workdays, but the values in Table A1 reflect this possibility. 
As mentioned earlier, extending possible shopping hours in no way requires a business 
to stay open longer. In fact, Kosfeld (2002) observed that many stores that initially extended 
shopping hours in Germany following the 1996 deregulation have since reverted back to their 
preregulation hours (p.52). More recent research has found the old store opening hour 
restrictions to be binding constraints.  By the beginning of 2012, 3,000 of 5,700 Rewe stores, 
Germany’s second largest food retailer, were open until 10 pm, with 260 stores operating even 
until midnight (Seidel 2012). Bossler and Oberfichtner (2014) found average opening hours per 
week of 76.7 in deregulating states, compared to 73.1 hours in Bavaria (where no deregulation 
occurred) by examining the store hours of Edeka, Germany’s largest food retailer (p. 21).  
 To test the effect on large stores, I analyzed the opening hours of IKEAs in Germany. 
Only in Bavaria and Saarland do closing times push against the limits; in all other states, the 
constraint does not appear binding because store hours could be further extended. 1All IKEA 
stores open past 8 pm are taking advantage of deregulated store hours; under the 
Ladenschlussgesetz, stores had to close by 8 pm nationwide.  I examined a hand-selected 
anecdotal sample of small stores in Bautzen, a town in Saxony. Here, none of the stores appear 
                                                          
1 The reasons for not extending hours up to the constraint are probably economic and sociocultural in nature. It 
may not be profitable to extend hours for stores in relatively smaller cities. Most likely, customers would not 
expect stores to remain open later, so traffic might be low, especially if surrounding stores have long closed.  
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to have been bound by the opening hour restrictions. Extended opening hours seem to have 
been adopted by a significant number of medium and large stores, but few small stores.  
Concentration of Larger Stores 
Whether deregulation of store opening hours has any effect on the concentration of 
larger stores and hypermarkets is an open question. Clemenz (1990) builds a theoretical model 
in which deregulation “either has no effects or it reduces prices, increases consumer welfare, 
and leads to an increase of the relative market shares of efficient firms” (p.1324).  Smaller 
stores, which face higher costs, will benefit most from trading hour regulations (p. 1336).  
If smaller stores benefit from regulation, as Clemenz showed and lobbyists contend, 
then we should expect to see a weakening of the economic position of smaller, traditional 
stores when opening hour regulations are lifted. Larger retail stores should strengthen their 
market shares, and this increase could occur through a number of different channels. 
Possible Sources of Advantage for Larger Stores.  Research by Baker (2002), cited 
by the Australian Government Productivity Commission (2011), points to a shift toward larger 
shopping centers by ‘time-poor’ but well-off consumers, who face relatively low transportation 
costs (p. 281). These consumers are likely to be two-income households who can now take 
advantage of extended hours. Here it is important to consider a spatial perspective. Larger 
shopping centers are generally located further from city centers than small, traditional 
supermarkets, often due to their size. Therefore, it may be difficult for consumers, especially 
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those with limited time, to access them during normal opening hours. As hours are extended, 
the locational disadvantage of larger centers dissipates.  
There is also a greater return to capital investment because of longer operating hours. 
When a large supermarket or hypermarket stays closed, there is underutilization of the 
property, of equipment, etc. (Australian Government Productivity Commission, 2011, p.278). As 
those fixed costs are spread out over longer hours and more business, larger stores can 
compete better with smaller stores. 
However, every store that chooses to open longer must face some additional costs, 
most significantly employee wages, and larger stores are in a better position to manage labor 
costs. The demand for labor increases both through a “sales effect” of higher revenue and 
through a “threshold effect” of necessary minimum staffing during all hours; meanwhile, a 
“smoothing” of sales during peak hours can be expected, reducing labor productivity (Gradus, 
1996, cited in Skuterud, 2005, p. 1967). Small retailers are more susceptible to a threshold labor 
constraint (Boylaud and Nicoletti, 2001, cited in Australian Government Productivity 
Commission, 2011, p. 307). A large retailer can close different departments (bakery, deli, etc.) 
during off-hours, bringing down its labor demand to what would be similar to a smaller 
supermarket. For a smaller supermarket, though, those labor costs constitute a larger share of 
revenue. Thus, it is difficult for a small supermarket to compete with respect to labor costs. 
Evidently, compared to smaller stores, larger stores can better adjust to changes in labor 
costs, and deregulation can additionally help them overcome locational disadvantages. It 
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appears as if they benefit from deregulation through greater returns to capital investment and 
possibly, an increase in efficiency, although there are mixed opinions on this issue.  
The Effect of Efficiency.  For all stores, longer hours allow for certain efficiency gains. 
Inventory, especially in regard to perishable goods, can be managed at a lower cost when 
stores can receive (just-in-time) deliveries and sell products during those extended hours. The 
larger the store, and its inventory, the more significant those gains should be. Overall, though, 
researchers disagree whether or not there is a net increase in the efficiency of firms, especially 
large stores, due to deregulation. 
Some scholars argue that deregulation actually leads to a reduction in efficiency. Tullock 
(1984) believes that the increase in operating costs due to deregulation outweighs the increase 
in sales, as consumers only reschedule their purchases and do not actually consume more (as 
cited in Lanoie, Tanguay, and Vallee, 1994, p. 179).2 In this case, consumer welfare would 
probably increase, but not efficiency for firms; consumers benefit from the flexibility offered by 
additional opening hours, but firms may not. Some companies, such as the fast food chain 
Chick-fil-A, have been able to compete very well in their markets despite having more limited 
opening hours. More recently, a German study finds an increase in “hedonistic” shopping, 
especially on weekends, that should “lead to an increase in overall retail sales” (Grünhagen, 
                                                          
2 However, Clemenz (1990) discounts these possible cost increases as “not well founded” (p. 1335). 
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Grove, and Gentry, 2003, p.1812). If sales have increased considerably, then operating cost 
increases can be overcome, and Tullock’s argument for decreased efficiency may not hold. 
Ferris (1990) also argues that deregulation reduces efficiency: owners cannot price 
discriminate based on the day or time, but they will open longer to compete for the marginal 
consumer, even when it would not be efficient to do so (as cited in Lanoie, Tanguay, and Vallee, 
1994, p. 179-180). The result is an oversupply of hours, and many stores, unable to cover their 
costs, will exit the industry. Whether or not the rational shop owner would actually extend 
hours, knowing the associated additional costs, is an open question. 
Efficiency differences seem to play a large role in determining how deregulation will 
affect retailers, and usually, larger stores benefit from more efficient structures, increased 
buying power, and economies of scale. Wenzel (2011, p.146) concludes that under asymmetric 
opening hours, larger retailers benefit as long as their cost efficiency difference is large. 
Otherwise, under a small cost efficiency difference, deregulation may actually favor small 
retailers. 
It is important to note that efficiency differences can have a continuing, dynamic effect. 
Deregulation contributed to comparatively high productivity growth in the Swedish retail 
sector, in contrast to Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands (Kjøller-Hansen, Thelle, & 
Lindén, 2013, p.18). This continuing productivity growth can reinforce the initial effects 
deregulation had on the Swedish retail sector, which is extremely concentrated.  
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Prior Studies on Store Concentration.  Wenzel (2010, p.518) captures the effects of 
all additional operating costs: longer opening hours work as higher entry costs would, so the 
number of stores decreases. “Following a deregulation, the model predicts concentration in the 
retail sector to rise,” raising prices (pgs. 524-525). However, there is not yet empirical evidence 
for such a deregulation- retail sector concentration relationship. This thesis aims to investigate 
this connection through data from German states. 
Previous attempts to provide evidence have ended with contradictory results. A study 
by Ferris (1991) shows that Ontario municipalities with limited hours have a larger number of 
stores, whereas Moorehouse (1984) finds that American states with restricted Sunday shopping 
have fewer stores (Lanoie et al., 1994, p.180). Morrison and Newman (1983) empirically show a 
redistribution of sales from small to large stores following deregulation, and data from British 
Columbia by Lanoie et al. (1994, p. 181) support such a shift in market share. However, three 
years of data does not provide strong empirical support. Cross-sectional data from Australia 
from 2008-2009 finds “no relationship between the proportion of small retail businesses and 
the stringency of trading-hours regulation in each state and territory” (Australian Government 
Productivity Commission, 2011, p.308). However, the smallest proportions of small retail 
businesses are in the deregulated states (p.309). The empirical evidence available 
internationally on this topic is still inconclusive and is based on short time frames. 
Small Firm Entry/Exit 
A decision about entry or exit in an industry underlies the change in the proportion of 
small businesses. Therefore, it may be helpful to investigate the factors a small business must 
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consider in an entry or exit decision. Ingene and Lusch (1981) argue that retailers’ entry or exit 
is due only to long-term changes, not any short-run factors (as cited in Kong-Wing, 1996, p.45). 
However, Kong-Wing finds that retailers do in fact respond to short-term and medium-term 
changes in the economy, such as a recession; in fact, “individual enterprises do not have any 
long-term planning.” (p.55) Deregulation, though, is a long-term change. 
Politicians and trade groups may argue for shopping hour regulations on the basis that 
they protect small businesses from closing due to intense competition from larger competitors. 
Cabral (2007, p.84) argues that this is not worth protecting against, as smaller firms face smaller 
experimentation costs, so it should be expected that we see higher entry and exit rates for 
smaller firms. And smaller firms do enter and exit an industry more frequently: “survival rates 
tend to be increasing in firm size and age.” (p. 68). His competitive selection model attributes 
this to the higher efficiency of larger firms: more efficient firms have lower marginal costs, and 
firms are pricing at their expected marginal costs, so through lower prices, more efficient firms 
can sell more output and capture higher market share (p.78). Thus, exiting firms are smaller 
than average. 
 When it comes to entry and exit, the entry process is slower than the exit process due 
to low sunk costs (Kong-Wing, 1996, p. 45). As a result, we should expect a relatively immediate 
exit reaction to negative shocks, but only a lagged entry reaction to positive shocks. This 
intuitively makes sense, as economic recoveries also usually take much longer. 
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Kong-Wing’s research into exit/entry by Chinese firms finds that economic changes are 
more important than competition in exit/entry decisions (p.43). However, Borraz et al. (2013, 
p.88) describe a different situation in Uruguay, where the entry of supermarkets creates a 
significant, although relatively modest, competitive threat to the survival of small stores. Data 
from Tokyo from the 1990s shows that large supermarkets’ entry (sometimes referred to as the 
“Walmart effect”) induces the exit of existing large and medium-size competitors, but actually 
improves the survival rates of small supermarkets (Igami, 2011, p.1). Igami cites as key factors 
small stores’ product differentiation and the positive externality of additional shoppers 
generated by a new large supermarket. Other mixed evidence as to the effects of entry and exit 
on other retail stores is also available.  
Intensive and Extensive Margin 
For small stores, the intensive margin appears to be the more viable method of 
adjusting to longer store hours, while this may not necessarily be true for large stores. 
Managers and owners may be forced to work because they cannot pay higher wages, but, as 
noted earlier, smaller stores are more susceptible to a threshold labor constraint (Australian 
Government Productivity Commission, p.33). Therefore, an intensive strategy may not be 
sufficient to compete for customers. In Germany, both intensive and extensive margin 
adjustment costs are a significant barrier due to union-negotiated overtime wages and 
employment protection legislation. Merkl and Wesselbaum (2011, p.806) find that although the 
extensive margin is the dominant force in the United States and Germany, the extensive margin 
is somewhat more important in the United States. This study, though, does not differentiate 
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between small and large businesses, which may rely on extensive margin adjustment to 
different degrees. 
Summary of Theoretically Expected Changes in Germany 
 As shopping hours are deregulated, some stores, but most likely not all, will choose to 
stay open longer. Those that decide to remain open longer should do so because they believe 
they have sufficient additional demand for those hours/days and have the staffing to fill those 
opening hour shifts. Thus, larger stores will tend to make more use of the extended hours. This 
is due to higher efficiency gains, according to Clemenz (1990) and Wenzel (2011), and greater 
returns to capital investments. Smaller stores are hesitant to open longer due to their higher 
costs and threshold labor constraints, as Gradus (1996) explains. With extended opening hours, 
stores can capture higher market share and earn higher profits by diverting shopping to those 
additional hours. The competitive position of stores that retain regular hours (mostly small 
stores) is thus worsened.  
 As a result, small stores may no longer be able to compete and will choose to leave the 
market through bankruptcy. As Wenzel (2010) notes, new small-store entry may effectively be 
restricted through the “entry barrier” that longer shopping hours present. Stores that do 
extend opening hours will tend to add employees, so we should expect to see fewer small retail 
stores (0-9 employees and 10-49 employees) and more large stores (50-249 and 250+ 
employees) in states after they have deregulated. Ceteris paribus, the distribution of store sizes 




This section will provide insight into an individual firm’s decision to extend opening 
hours. On a national level, these decisions lead to the data that will be used in the difference-in-
difference model. Owners can hire more workers and move to a larger size category, or if they 
miscalculate or misjudge the market, they may be forced to close their business. 
Each firm has its own production function, which shows the relationship between the 
quantities of inputs used and the quantity of output that can be produced. The factors of 
production can be simplified to only labor and capital. For a firm to extend opening hours, it 
must increase labor, but not necessarily capital, unless it has self-checkout registers, which are 
uncommon in Germany. 
In economics, the short-run is differentiated from the long-run in that in the long-run, 
the quantity of all inputs can be adjusted. For most retail stores, labor can be increased in the 
short-run because highly skilled workers are not really needed. Therefore stores should be able 
to increase labor to meet longer opening hours, if they choose to do so. 
Focusing on the firm’s opening hour decision, the owner could consider marginal costs 
and sunk costs. Marginal costs would include hourly wages, utilities, etc. As for marginal costs, 
these will be key to the owner’s decision. The marginal revenue product of labor (MRPL) is 
compared to the marginal cost of labor, the wage. The profit-maximizing firm would choose L 
so that the wage equals the additional revenue received through the employee. In the short 
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run, this is given by 𝑝𝑀𝑃𝐿 = 𝑤 for competitive firms and 𝑝 (1 +
1
𝜀𝑖
) 𝑀𝑃𝐿 = 𝑤 for 
noncompetitive firms (Perloff, 2014, pgs. 530-533). 
Since we are considering off-peak hours, diminishing marginal returns probably occur: 
staying open one more hour, e.g. from 10 to 11 pm, does not increase sales as much as deciding 
to close at 6 pm instead of 5 pm. Thus, the MRPL  tends to decrease with hours worked.  
Sunk costs describe those costs that must be paid regardless of the opening hours 
chosen. For a retailer, the monthly rent or advertising would be classified as sunk costs, so 
these expenses are irrelevant for marginal analysis. Higher returns on investment can be 
achieved because longer hours could create additional revenue. 
Longer store hours can also serve as a differentiating factor to improve a store’s 
competitive position. Compared to perfectly competitive firms, monopolistically competitive 
and oligopolistic firms achieve a position of higher profits (at least in the short-run) due to their 
differentiated products. If a store remains open longer than all of its competitors, then it does 
offer a unique service. Were all stores to increase their opening hours, store hours could act as 
a barrier to entry into the market because new entrants would require more capital to establish 
themselves and compete directly with their rivals (Wenzel, 2010). 
Thus far, we have focused on the firm’s perspective. From a societal viewpoint, longer 
store hours can increase consumer welfare, which is a measure of “the benefit a consumer gets 
from consuming that good in excess of its cost” (Perloff, 2014, p.139).  If we consider cost to 
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include opportunity cost, then the cost of goods can decline with longer hours. Shoppers place 
a value on their time, so extended hours permit them to reschedule their purchases to more 
convenient times, when there is a lower opportunity cost to do so. Thus, cost decreases, and 





The values for the variables described below are compiled in the Appendix, Table A2. 
Retail Business Sizes (By Number of Employees) 
German regional data, at the state level, can be found through the website of the 
Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical Office). The Unternehmensregister-95 system 
contains statistics about registered businesses in Germany. Information for variable WZ-G in 
the category “Handel, Instandh. u. Rep. v. Kfz u.Gebrauchsgütern” (Trade, Maintenance and 
Repair of Automobiles and Consumer Goods) is available for years 2002-2011.  The registry 
categorizes “Trade, Maintenance, and Repair” businesses by the number of employees (0-9, 10-
49, 50-249, 250+).  
The differences between the states are evident in absolute terms: in 2011 Northrhine-
Westphalia had 146,755 small stores (0-9 employees), while Bremen only 4,957. Therefore, 
examining percentage changes, as displayed in Table A3, in the store size categories may allow 
for more relevant comparison. There is a general downward trend, starting in 2005 but 
intensifying in 2008/2009, for the number of businesses with 0-9 employees. Most states 
experienced an increase in larger businesses, beginning in 2009 and 2010. However, when 
graphing the states against each other, most states appear to have very smooth curves with 
little total fluctuation in the number of stores (see Appendix Figure A1). 
The data on Trade, Maintenance and Repair of Automobiles and Consumer Goods had 
to be manipulated slightly before proceeding further. Starting with the year 2006, minor 
adjustments were made by the Statistisches Bundesamt to the calculation method; therefore, 
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the variable was renamed WZ08-G. For the year 2006, both WZ-G and WZ08-G are available, so 
I replaced those values with a mean measure for 2006 to use in calculations (Table A2). 
German Retail Sector Employment 
The Statistisches Bundesamt also offers data about employment in the retail sector 
(variable WZ-G) for the years 2002-2011. The table Sozialversicherungspflichtig Beschäftigte am 
Arbeitsort: Bundesländer, Stichtag, Geschlecht, Wirtschaftszweige presents the number of 
employees subject to Social Security contributions by the federal state of their workplace and 
their sector. Females and males are counted separately. The employment numbers are as of 
December 31 of each year. Years 2002-2007 were calculated using standard WZ2003, whereas 
years 2008-2011 utilized standard WZ2008, which differed slightly in the types of business 
counted in order to comply with international standards. The effects of the recession can be 
clearly seen here: in every state but Hamburg, there is a decline in retail sector employment in 
2009. Employment then increases in 2010 and 2011. The overall change between 2002 and 
2011 is positive for eight states. 
Business Bankruptcies in Germany 
Bankruptcy statistics by federal states for the years 2002-2011 are available through 
Table 325-31-4-B in the Statistisches Bundesamt database. This table includes all bankruptcies 
filed in that year, without categorizing the firms into different business sectors. Despite this 
limitation, these statistics can help evaluate the economic conditions in each federal state in 
the time period being considered. The number of bankruptcies filed is generally increasing in all 
states until 2009 or 2010, after which bankruptcies start to decrease. Nevertheless, the number 
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of bankruptcies in 2011 is still much higher than 2002; in several states (Northrhine-Westphalia 
and Lower Saxony), the bankruptcies in 2011 values are more than twice as large as those in 
2002. 
Retail Sector Value-Added Tax Revenue 
Value-added tax revenue reflects economic conditions in each year and the profitability 
of businesses in each state. Unfortunately, the Statistisches Bundesamt data only includes the 
years 2007-2011, and repeated attempts to attain older data were unsuccessful. Therefore, this 
variable was excluded from the estimated models. 
State Populations 
State population data from the period 2002-2012 can be found on the Statistisches 
Bundesamt website. The German states differ significantly in area and population, affecting 
their potential economic strength. For example, the population of Northrhine-Westphalia 
(17,841,956) many times exceeds that of Bremen (661,301 inhabitants). Two trends are 
interesting to note in the state population data. Five states, after years of decreases, show 
population increases in 2010 and 2011. Unlike many other states, Hamburg and Berlin had 
sustained population increases from at least 2005 until 2011. In total, though, from 2002 to 
2012, only Bavaria and Hamburg did not suffer from an overall decrease in the population. 




Description of Difference-in-Difference Model 
To find the effects of shopping hour deregulation in German states, a difference-in-
difference econometric model will be utilized. This model compares states that have 
deregulated with those that have not before and after the deregulation period. Even though a 
true experiment is difficult to conduct, the different state deregulation policies provide an 
exploitable source of natural variation in a quasi-experimental setting. A difference-in-
difference model is a version of fixed effects estimation using aggregate data (Angrist and 
Pischke, 2009, p. 228), in our case, aggregate retail business data from Germany. Such a model 
allows for combining time series and cross-section analyses to solve the problems associated 
with each, namely the time series factors that would bias time series analysis and the omitted 
factors that would bias cross-section analysis (Gruber, 2007, p.78). Bavaria and Saarland serve 
as the main controls as there has been no significant increase in store opening hours in these 
states.3 All of the other states (the “treatment group”) have greatly increased hours since 2006 
or 2007. However, deregulation in Rhineland-Palatinate and Saxony has been less than in other 
states, so they may be counted as part of the “control group,” depending on the definition of 
the treatment. 
                                                          
3 This is consistent with the control groups of other researchers. In Senftleben-König’s (2014) study of the effects 
of deregulation on employment in Germany, her control group is composed of Saarland and Bavaria. In a similar 
study (2014), Bossler and Oberfichtner’s control group only includes Bavaria. Saarland was completely excluded 
from the sample because the shops were “slightly treated” because they could now open for 24 hours once a year 




The following logic will be tested: if deregulation has no effect on store size, controlling 
for some effects, then the changes in store sizes in each state between 2002 and 2011 should 
follow the same trend. If the political and trade union argument holds true, though, 
deregulation would have a significant effect in the treatment group, reducing the number of 
smaller retail shops in states where opening hours have been extended. Here is a simplified 
example of the comparison a difference-in-difference model makes, as adapted from Gruber 
(2007, p.77): 
(1) Businesses (Berlin, 2007) – Businesses (Berlin, 2006) = Treatment effect + Bias from 
economic conditions 
 
(2) Businesses (Bavaria, 2007) – Businesses (Bavaria, 2006) = Bias from economic conditions  
 
Therefore, upon subtracting Eq. (2) from Eq. (1), one arrives at 
 
(3) [Bus. (Berlin, 07) – Bus. (Berlin, 06)] –  [Bus. (Bavaria, 07) – Bus. (Bavaria, 06)] = Treatment 
effect 
  When I subtract the change in the number of businesses in Bavaria (a control group) 
from the change in the number of businesses in Berlin (a treatment group), I can control for 
bias due to any changes in economic conditions in Germany to arrive at a difference-in-
difference estimator, an estimate of the effect of deregulation (the treatment) on the number 
of stores. The key identifying assumption is that trends in the areas would have evolved in the 
same way in absence of the treatment. The graphs in the Appendix Figures A1 show a 
comparison of the trends. The trends for the control and treatment groups appear to remain 
similar for small, small/medium, and medium/large stores during the entire period studied. 
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Only with large stores do we see a departure from this similarity, starting in 2010. This could 
possibly indicate effects of deregulation. 
Regression Model 
The following equation will be used to model the effects of deregulation in a state on 
the number of retail stores in a state: 
𝑦𝑠𝑡 =  𝛽1𝐷𝑠𝑡
𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑠
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡
+  𝜏𝑡 + 𝛿𝑠 + 𝜖𝑠𝑡 
In this equation, the response variable, 𝑦𝑠𝑡, represents the number of small stores (0-9 
employees and 10-49 employees) or the number of large stores (50-249 employees and 250+ 
employees) for a specific state, s, in a given year, t. I run separate regressions for both small 
stores and large stores as the dependent variable. The dummy variable 𝐷𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 takes the value 
of 1 if the given year is after deregulation has occurred in that state and the value of 0 if the 
year is before deregulation occurred. If the deregulation was passed after June 30, the next 
year is counted as the year of the policy change. 
The value of the scale variable 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 depends on the strength of the deregulation 
policy in that state and lies between 0 and 1, as used in Senftleben-König (2014).4 Such a 
treatment definition seemed preferable to the two extremes of strict treatment (excluding 
Bavaria, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, and Saxony) and less strict treatment (fully including 
                                                          
4 Senftleben-König incorporates the differing deregulation intensity of German states through a variable that is 
based on the “percentage change in hours that shops are allowed to open“ through the new legislation (p.14). This 




Rhineland-Palatinate and Saxony in the treatment group). The values for the scale variable can 
be found in Appendix Table A4.  
The coefficient of interest is 𝛽1 , which shows the effect on the number of stores, ceteris 
paribus, of significant deregulation in a state. If the scale and the dummy variable were both 1, 
this coefficient would have its full impact on the number of stores of each type.  
The model contains several other explanatory variables. The employment in the retail 
industry in each state in the given year is measured by 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡. During a weaker 
economy or a recession, staff levels might be reduced and the company might move to a lower 
size category.  The number of bankruptcies in each state in the given year is shown through 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑠. The previous two variables are all measures of the general economic 
conditions. These are especially important since the global recession greatly affected Germany 
in 2008, so through these variables and the year fixed effects, the impact of the recession can 
be accounted for.  
To control for significant population differences between the states, the population of 
the states will also be considered through the variable population. I also include constants, 𝛿𝑠, 
in the equation, one for each of the states; these are the state fixed effects, which represent 
the effects on 𝑦𝑠𝑡 by unobservable factors specific to each state. The standard errors in the 
regressions are clustered at the state level to allow for correlation within states (the clusters) 
because we cannot assume that the values for one state over time are independent of each 
other. Year fixed effects are captured through the term 𝜏𝑡. The error term,𝜖𝑠𝑡, captures 
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anything omitted from the regression that varies across the states and years. If these 
unobservable variables are uncorrelated with 𝑦𝑠𝑡, then they are not problematic to our analysis.  
When I conduct the analysis, I plan to perform various robustness checks to see how 
sensitive my results are to changes in the variables. I would change the opening hour threshold 
when determining which states to include in the treatment group. A “strict” definition of 
“significant deregulation” is an increase in opening hours to at least 6000; this therefore leaves 
Bavaria, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Saxony with a value of 0 for 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡.  A “less strict” 
definition would leave only Bavaria and Saarland in the control group. The classification of 
“small” and “large” stores would also be modified to include “small and medium” stores and 
“medium and large” stores.  
An additional robustness check would transform the level 𝑦𝑠𝑡 variable to a logarithmic 
form.  All of the coefficients (𝛽1, 𝛽2…) then represent the change in log (number of stores) when 
the explanatory variable increases by one, and when the coefficients are multiplied by 100, 
they show the approximate percentage change in the number of stores (Wooldridge, 2006, 
p.197). The percentage change interpretation can make sense for this data because a difference 
of 10 stores is more important when there is a change from, for example, 10 large stores to 20 
large stores, compared to a change from 210 to 220 large stores.  
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Evaluating the Strength of the Study Design 
According to Meyer (p. 153), the three “goals of a research design should be: (1) find 
variation in the key explanatory variables that is exogenous, (2) find comparison groups that are 
comparable and, (3) probe the implications of the hypotheses under test.” 
The major problem with “natural experiment” studies is that the assumption of 
randomness is not credible (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 2000, p. 828). Meyer likewise warns that 
policy changes may be driven by political factors associated with outcomes (p.159). Senftleben-
König (2014), though, does make a convincing case for exogeneity in the deregulation law 
change (p.5). For example, Bavaria had first announced a “pioneering role” in store closing hour 
deregulation, but the vote resulted in a tie after the Prime Minister had to leave early. Thus, 
Bavaria did not deregulate. 
It is the second goal that warrants the most scrutiny. As the number of retail businesses, 
employment, bankruptcy, taxable revenue, and population data all indicate, there are 
significant differences between the states being compared. As Meyer suggests, it is desirable to 
have multiple comparison groups with greater differences (p.157); such is the case with the two 
states (Bavaria and Saarland) with no deregulation. To improve comparability, he also 
recommends extending research to multiple pre-intervention and post-intervention time 
periods (p.157), and fortunately we have data from 2002 to 2011, several years before and 
after deregulation in 2006 and 2007. We have “multiple comparison groups” and “multiple time 
periods” also in the sense that states are receiving the “treatment” (deregulation) at different 
times; a state may even be part of the control group in 2006, and then belong to the treatment 
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group in 2007 upon extending its permitted retail opening hours. To avoid omitted variable 
bias, it is worth asking whether groups with different mean values of a possibly unmeasured 
variable respond to other factors similarly (p.157). Through the available data, states seem to 
be similarly affected by factors such as the recent recession and the subsequent recovery. 
As Meyer notes, a “recession may have a disproportionate effect” (p.155) on one group, 
such as smaller shop owners. Although the recession appears to impact retail store owners 
similarly across the states, it is a source of variation that unfortunately cannot be completely 
eliminated, a downside of a natural experiment such as this. Therefore, as far as probing the 
implications of the hypotheses, one must be very careful in applying the results to different 





This section reports the results obtained from the difference-in-difference ordinary least 
squares regressions.  
First, the OLS model without modifications was tested. The term “intx” represents the 
multiplication of term 𝐷𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 and 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡, so this becomes the variable of interest. For my 
main results, I used the scale treatment definition.5 These results are presented in Table 3. With 
the scale value treatment, most of the p-values for the interaction term were lower, indicating 
that this could be the best treatment definition to apply.  
However, none of the intx terms prove significant. The signs on the intx coefficients also 
do not fit the model’s predictions: according to the regression output, the number of small or 
small/medium stores increases with deregulation, but the number of large or medium/large 
stores decreases. Because the coefficients are not significantly different from zero, though, this 
is not a great area of concern.  
The model appears to be supported by a very high 𝑅2value (99%), but this is due to little 
variation in the number of stores over time and the presence of state fixed effects. Once state 
fixed effects are introduced to the model, 𝑅2 increases to 99%, regardless of the presence of 
other dependent variables (Table 6). The little variation there is in the number of stores appears 
                                                          
5 I also tested alternative types of treatments, including the “strict” definition of treatment and “less strict” 




to be almost completely absorbed by the state fixed effects. Although the 𝑅2value stayed 
relatively constant, the root mean squared error changed considerably between the different 
regressions run. The MSE was much higher for small-store models; thus, those models have 
much more variability, also due to the higher number of small stores than large stores. The 
fitted regression line is further from the data points. 
Some adjustments were made to this model, and the results of these tests can be found 
in the Appendix. Table A5 shows results excluding the recession years 2007 and 2008. Tables 
A6-8 display the results obtained with the original time period but different definitions of 
treatment; Table A7 uses the strict treatment definition, but considers only West German 
states.6 
Next, modifications to test robustness were applied to the regression for large stores. 
The first column of Table 4 is identical to the large store column of Table 3. In the next columns, 
explanatory variables were omitted to test their impacts on the model. The fifth column’s only 
explanatory variable is the strength of deregulation. The R-Squared value remains nearly as 
high as in the other tests, and the intx coefficient is still not significant, but in absolute terms, 
not much changed, compared with the previous tests with more explanatory variables. This 
suggests a low explanatory power on the part of the other variables. Finally, the dependent 
                                                          
6 In their study of the effect of German shopping hour deregulation on food retailing employment, Bossler and 
Oberfichtner (2014) excluded all former East German states because they are  “still affected by lower economic 




variable was changed to logarithmic form, which also did not result in a significant intx 
coefficient. Similar modifications to the regressions can be seen in the Appendix, Tables A9-19, 
for the tests using different store sizes and different treatment definitions. 
To conclude, I tested the original OLS model with different dependent variables, 
bankruptcies and retail employment, and regressed these only on the interaction term and the 
state and year fixed effects. Given the strong correlation between bankruptcies and the 
number of stores in Tables 3 and 4, I specifically wanted to ensure that the effect on stores of 
deregulation was not only due to bankruptcies.  The test in Table 5 shows no significant effect 
of deregulation on bankruptcies, which supports the original formulation of the model. The 
tests for strict and less strict treatment definitions can be found in the Appendix, Tables A20 
and A21. I did not test state population as a possible dependent variable because as seen in 
Table 4, removing it from the original equation does not increase the p-values of the interaction 





The results displayed in the previous section will be discussed in this section, and other 
possible models will be considered. In addition, shortcomings of this research and possible 
future research extensions will be examined. 
Discussion of Results 
The models above found no significant change in the number of stores due to 
deregulation, regardless of size category. Considering the research in the Literature Review 
section, this could be due to a number of factors. Although customers may now be growing 
accustomed to grocery stores opening longer, most customers tend to still shop during 
“normal“ hours, especially for specialty items, which small stores often sell. Another possibility 
could be that at least some of these small stores have used deregulation to find unique “niches“ 
for themselves, for instance, by only opening in the later evening hours and offering alcohol 
and other products. Either way, small stores do not seem to have been significantly negatively 
affected by deregulation. 
With respect to the other store size categories, the effects of deregulation may simply 
be contained within the categories. The additional workers that might be hired to extend 
opening hours might not translate into a change in size category, so there would be no 
movement between categories in the data. Further research would be needed to support any 
of these possible explanations. 
Even if no certain conclusion can be reached from firms’ perspectives, deregulation in 
other countries has had a positive effect on consumers. Longer opening hours are known to 
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reduce the opportunity cost of shopping for consumers and increase consumer welfare due to 
time savings. Estimates from the effects of the revision of the Danish Shops Act in 1995 place 
the aggregate consumer welfare gains at between 5 and 6 billion DKK, about $1 billion at 
current exchange rates. (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2000, p. 8). This is consistent with 
Wenzel (2010), who predicted an increase in consumer welfare due to deregulation. The same 
welfare benefits can theoretically be expected in Germany. 
Other Models Considered 
Although state fixed effects logically fit my model, they lead to extremely high 𝑅2values. 
Removing them might allow me to better understand which variables have higher explanatory 
power. However, when state fixed effects were omitted from the model, the regression still 
produced a 𝑅2value of 92%. The other independent variables (state population, retail 
employment, and business bankruptcies) seem to act almost like state fixed effects because 
they change relatively little over the years. 
Besides the ordinary least squares regression, there are other possible models to explain 
a relationship between deregulation and store sizes. A two-stage least squares regression 
model uses an instrumental variable approach. A 2SLS model requires two assumptions: that 
the instrument has no partial effect on y and is not correlated with unobserved factors that 
affect y; in addition, the instrument must be related to the endogenous explanatory variable 
(such as bankruptcies) (Wooldridge, 2006, p.512). These assumptions probably cannot be 
satisfied because the OLS regression equation does not show a significant effect when 
bankruptcies (a possible instrumented variable) is regressed on only the interaction term (a 
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possible instrument) and fixed effects (Table 5). This is the drawback of 2SLS: it can be difficult 
to find an appropriate instrument.  
Therefore, other estimator methods using an instrumental variable approach are also 
not feasible. Furthermore, there are additional reasons to avoid such models. According to 
Wansbeek and Knaap (1999), the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) estimator 
has seldom been used for panel data contexts (p. 338). The Generalized Methods of Moments 
(GMM) Estimator suffers from finite-sample problems (Wooldridge, 2001, p.91). While OLS will 
be unbiased and consistent, GMM is only guaranteed to be consistent (p.90-91). Consequently, 
OLS remains the model of choice, given the data available.  
Research Shortcomings 
Generally, my research suffered because of the great difficulty of finding consistent data 
for my variables of interest, over longer time periods. As a result, the models became very 
saturated, with many independent variables (twenty-eight) and a relatively small number of 
observations (generally, n=160). Germany’s 16 total states were, unfortunately, a natural 
limitation. The assumptions required for fixed effects estimators can be found in Wooldridge 
(2006, pgs. 507-508). In order for the estimator to be normally distributed, the idiosyncratic 
errors (𝑢𝑡) must be normally distributed (p.508). However, my regressions use standard errors 
clustered at the state level because my standard errors should be robust to heteroskedasticity 
and intra-group correlation. More clusters (states) would be preferable from an econometric 
perspective. Examining district level data within Germany would increase the number of 
clusters. Unfortunately, I did not have access to complete district level data for this project. 
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Several other data limitations are also worth mentioning here. Store sizes in terms of 
square meters or smaller categories (i.e. 10-25 employees instead of 10-49, etc.) perhaps would 
have produced more accurate results. For my measures of employment and the number of 
stores by number of employees, I had to work with two different standards, probably leading to 
a small amount of distortion. A measure of retail revenues, ideally on a store size level, would 
have greatly added to my model, but this was not available. Only VAT revenue was accessible, 
but not for the entire period under study. Finding the needed data was a major limitation. 
In contrast, both Bossler & Oberfichtner and Senftleben-König (2014) use employment 
data from the Establishment History Panel (BHP) of the Institute for Employment Research. As a 
UCF student, I could not obtain access to this database. Obtaining access through a German 
institution would have been beyond the scope of my undergraduate thesis, but this data would 
have been beneficial to my research.  
Like Bossler & Oberfichtner and Senftleben-König, my research was likely affected by 
the Great Recession. The recession occurred just after deregulation laws were enacted, 
affecting the economic situation in Germany from at least 2008 on. This makes it very difficult 
to examine post-deregulation effects in isolation. Removing the pre-recession year 2007 and 
the recession year 2008, as in Appendix Table A5, still does not solve this issue because of 
inherent lingering recessionary effects beyond 2008. Much of the variation due to the recession 
has been addressed through the use of year fixed effects because these control for 
characteristics of each particular year. The year fixed effects are a kind of yearly average for the 
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German states. In reality, though, some states were hurt more by the recession than others: 
between 2006 and 2009, Saarland’s GDP fell 5.2%, while Berlin’s increased 3.9% (Losse, 2010). 
During the time period of deregulation, online retailing was on the rise in Germany too, 
probably influencing the survival of brick-and-mortar stores and the decision to deregulate. 
According to retailers association HDE, overall retail sales in Germany are expected to increase 
very modestly, with diminishing sales at physical stores offset by online growth (Sloat, 2014). It 
is estimated that as many as 50,000 physical stores could “be wiped off the map by the digital 
wave” by 2020 (Sloat). The article mentions that weekends and evenings are the strongest 
periods for online shopping, when most brick-and-mortar shops are closed. Growth in online 
retailing is likely also affecting store opening hour decisions and financial survival. With respect 
to deregulation, online retailing makes opening hour constraints less binding. Because online 
shopping was increasing over the years, this change is mostly contained in year fixed effects, 
unless there are significant differences in online purchase behavior between the states.7 
Future Research Extensions 
Bossler & Oberfichtner also conducted their deregulation research at the district level in 
Germany. They found that the state-level approach I used was “very conservative” and had 
“little power to detect effects of moderate size” (p. 11). My research approach could be 
extended to the district level to uncover such effects and increase the number of observations. 
                                                          
7 For example, internet shopping may be a substitute for shopping at physical stores in more rural areas, whereas 
in urban areas, internet shopping may act as a complement. 
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Research like this could be undertaken with other European countries that have recently 
deregulated, like Sweden or Denmark. A longer post-deregulation period, and without the 
impact of the recession, would likely lead to better data and more significant results. If the data 
needed are available, such research could lead to new insights into the effects of shopping hour 
deregulation in different nations. 
Beyond the number of stores, store hour deregulation has likely had other effects, both 
economically and socially. Data specifically on retail bankruptcies could also be used as the 
dependent variable in an OLS regression with the deregulation term. For example, it may even 
be possible to locate in other databases bankruptcies or revenues at the store size level, and 
these relationships could be modeled. A model with bankruptcies by store size, for instance, 
would avoid the movement between store sizes that confounds the deregulation effect.  It 
would also be interesting to examine the welfare effects of deregulation on society as a whole, 
or individually, on households and business owners. Policy deregulation can affect many 





The results of my empirical models did not support the theoretical framework I derived 
from the literature. No significant effects of deregulation on the number of stores by size 
category could be found. The year and state fixed effects alone explained 99% of the variation 
in the number of retail stores by size (Table 6). This is consistent with the trends that occurred 
in Germany during this time, including the Great Recession and rise of e-commerce. Other than 
these year- and state-specific factors, stores appear not to have significantly adjusted their sizes 
in response to deregulation. 
 This could be due, for example, to different German institutional factors of the retail 
sector, or cross-cultural differences. For instance, employees in Germany usually have more 
rights, so retail firms may be less able to to respond to regulatory changes through increased 
hours than one might expect in the U.S.8 It may be too difficult to explain variation in the 
number of stores due to deregulation alone because a multitude of individual factors affect the 
hiring or shut-down decisions of stores. With more data about the retail sector, especially over 
a longer time frame, it might be possible to identify clearer repercussions of store hour 
deregulation on the number of stores by size. Right now it may ultimately be a case of “too 
early to tell,” where the full deregulatory effects and changes in shopping behavior have yet to 
be seen in the German retail sector. 
                                                          
8 Specifically, a store might hire an additional worker to extend hours on an experimental basis. Compared to the 
U.S., German employment laws would make it more difficult to fire this worker. Therefore, more risk is involved on 
the owner’s end. It is worth noting that the German Act Against Unfair Dismissal only applies to businesses with 
more than 10 employees, providing an incentive for firms to remain small. 
38 
  
The shopping hour constraints do not appear to be binding, as the observational data 
suggests. The deregulated hours have only been adopted by a limited number of retailers, 
especially with respect to smaller stores, and most customers have not considerably changed 
shopping habits. If shoppers would like to make purchases during off-peak hours, they may do 
so through catalogs or increasingly, the Internet. Therefore, there seems to be no significant 
effect on retail market shares. 
Deregulation can only have economic effects if individuals and businesses actually 
significantly change their shopping behaviors at brick-and-mortar retailers. Thus, it is possible 
that there is almost no deregulation effect, which would mean that we are looking for 
something that does not exist.  In this case, deregulation could possibly lead to economic 
growth (if there is sufficient evidence for this) and an increase in consumer welfare without 





Table 1: IKEA Store Hours by State 
STATE N MON.-THURS. FRI. SAT. SUN. 
BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG 6 9-10am to 8-9pm 9-10am to 8-10pm 9-10am to 8-9pm 0 
BAVARIA 6 9-10am to 8 pm 9-10am to 8 pm 9-10am to 8 pm 0 
BERLIN 3 10am to 9pm 10am to 9pm 10am to 9pm 0 
BRANDENBURG 1 10am to 8pm 10am to 9pm 10am to 9pm 0 
HAMBURG 3 10am to 7:30-9pm 10am to 7:30-9pm 10am to 7:30-9pm 0 
HESSE 4 10am to 8-9pm 10am to 9-10pm 10am to 8-9pm 0 
LOWER SAXONY 6 10am to 8-9pm 10am to 8-10pm 10am to 8-9pm 0 
MECKLENBURG-W. 
POMERANIA 
1 10am to 8pm 10am to 8pm 10am to 8pm 0 
NORTHRHINE-
WESTPHALIA 
10 10am to 8-9pm 10am to 9-10pm 10am to 8-9pm 0 
RHINELAND-PALATINATE 1 10amto 8pm 10amto 8pm 10amto 8pm 0 
SAARLAND 1 10amto 8pm 10amto 8pm 10amto 8pm 0 
SAXONY 2 10am to 8-9pm 10amto 10pm 10am to 8-9pm 0 
SAXONY-ANHALT 1 10amto 8pm 10amto 10pm 10amto 8pm 0 
SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN 2 10amto 8pm 10amto 8pm 10amto 8pm 0 
THURINGIA 1 10amto 8pm 10amto 9pm 10amto 8pm 0 











Table 2: Opening Hours of a Small Business Sample from Bautzen, Saxony  
STORE NAME LINE OF RETAIL MON.-FRI. SAT. SUN. 
KRETSCHMAR 
BUCHHANDLUNG 
Books 9:00 - 19:00 9:00-16:00 X 
FUSS UND SCHUH Shoes 10:00 - 18:00 10:00-14:00 X 
BETTENHAUS HEBER Bedding 9.30 - 18.00 09:30 - 12.00  X 
EP: DIE 
FERNSEHERWERKSTATT 
Electronics 09:00-19:00 09:00-13:00 X 
SCHUHHAUS MUTSCHER Shoes 9.00 - 18.30 09:00-13:00 X 
GESCHENKARTIKEL 
KREATIVLING 
Arts and crafts store 10.00 - 18.00 10:00-13:00 X 
ZOO KUNATH Pet supplies 10:00-18:00 9:00-12:00 X 
SEILEREI SCHÄFER Rope products 09:00 - 12:00, 13:00-17:00 X X 
TOM'S BABY- UND 
KINDERWELT 
Child clothing 09.30 - 18.30 09.30 - 14.00 X 
















Table 3: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Model with Scale Treatment 
      DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 SMALL 
STORES 






INTX 901.6 -6.829 673.6 -23.66 
 (783.0) (6.494) (711.0) (23.25) 
P-VALUES 0.268 0.310 0.358 0.325 
BANKRUPTCIES -0.140** 0.00174*** -0.0826 0.00975*** 
 (0.0518) (0.000531) (0.0504) (0.00203) 
P-VALUES 0.0166 0.00503 0.122 0.000230 
RETAILEMP -0.115*** 0.000431*** -0.0975*** 0.00280*** 
 (0.0227) (6.38e-05) (0.0237) (0.000590) 
P-VALUES 0.000145 6.36e-06 0.000909 0.000258 
STATEPOPULATION 0.0136** 2.25e-05 0.0139** 0.000165** 
 (0.00492) (2.02e-05) (0.00487) (6.12e-05) 











Note: Includes state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 4: OLS Model for LARGE Stores with Scale Treatment and Modifications 






















INTX -6.829 -4.776 -8.346 -7.250 -9.799 -7.629 0.0378 
 (6.494) (8.610) (8.831) (7.362) (11.89) (14.05) (0.0621) 
P-VALUES 0.310 0.587 0.360 0.340 0.423 0.595 0.551 
BANKRUPT
CIES 
0.00174***  0.00180*** 0.00169*** 0.00169***  4.04e-06 
 (0.000531)  (0.000465) (0.000476) (0.000460)  (5.75e-06) 
P-VALUES 0.00503  0.00153 0.00294 0.00223  0.493 
RETAILEMP 0.000431*** 0.000456***  0.000493***   1.02e-06 
 (6.38e-05) (8.65e-05)  (8.29e-05)   (1.42e-06) 
P-VALUES 6.36e-06 9.34e-05  2.68e-05   0.484 
STATEPOP
ULATION 
2.25e-05 1.39e-05 4.44e-05*    2.71e-07 
 (2.02e-05) (3.34e-05) (2.45e-05)    (3.01e-07) 












0.995 0.993 0.993 
 




Table 5: OLS Model with Scale Treatment, Regressing Bankruptcies or Retail Employment only on the Interaction 
Term and State and Year Fixed Effects  
     DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 BANKRUPTCIES RETAIL EMPLOYMENT 
INTX 1,282 -5,161 
 (2,038) (9,496) 
P-VALUES 0.539 0.595 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED 0.943 0.999 
Note: Includes state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 6: OLS Model with Scale Treatment, Regressing Store Size only on State and Year Fixed Effects  
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 




_ISTATE_2 30,814*** 53.25*** 32,869*** 291.9*** 
 (1.06e-09) (0) (7.76e-10) (0) 
 0 0 0 0 
_ISTATE_3 -68,428*** -85.45*** -76,165*** -1,396*** 
 (9.92e-10) (0) (3.22e-10) (0) 
 0 0 0 0 
_ISTATE_4 -72,515*** -132.1*** -79,829*** -1,546*** 
 (1.01e-09) (0) (3.13e-10) (0) 
 0 0 0 0 
_ISTATE_5 -87,821*** -129.6*** -96,610*** -1,663*** 
 (1.03e-09) (0) (3.12e-10) (0) 
 0 0 0 0 
_ISTATE_6 -75,319*** -64.35*** -83,105*** -1,399*** 
 (1.03e-09) (0) (3.03e-10) (0) 
 0 0 0 0 
_ISTATE_7 -37,596*** -41.80*** -41,637*** -733.0*** 
 (9.92e-10) (0) (2.87e-10) (0) 
 0 0 0 0 
_ISTATE_8 -25,938*** -72.45*** -27,911*** -560.6*** 
 (9.93e-10) (0) (2.98e-10) (0) 
 0 0 0 0 
_ISTATE_9 -79,516*** -137.8*** -87,425*** -1,648*** 
 (1.01e-09) (0) (2.93e-10) (0) 
 0 0 0 0 
_ISTATE_10 61,309*** 150.6*** 66,984*** 1,328*** 
 (1.02e-09) (0) (4.25e-10) (0) 
 0 0 0 0 
_ISTATE_11 -55,994*** -106.7*** -62,200*** -1,277*** 
 (9.92e-10) (0) (2.82e-10) (0) 
 0 0 0 0 
_ISTATE_12 -83,679*** -123.4*** -92,194*** -1,643*** 
 (9.98e-10) (0) (2.83e-10) (0) 
 0 0 0 0 
_ISTATE_13 -58,869*** -119.6*** -64,973*** -1,278*** 
 (9.92e-10) (0) (2.82e-10) (0) 
 0 0 0 0 
_ISTATE_14 -75,206*** -132.9*** -82,759*** -1,546*** 
 (9.94e-10) (0) (2.82e-10) (0) 
 0 0 0 0 
_ISTATE_15 -67,120*** -110.1*** -73,695*** -1,325*** 
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 (9.92e-10) (0) (2.83e-10) (0) 
 0 0 0 0 
_ISTATE_16 -73,687*** -131.1*** -81,249*** -1,584*** 
 (9.92e-10) (0) (2.83e-10) (0) 
 0 0 0 0 
_IYEAR_2003 -347.7 -0.750 -345.4 6.563 
 (460.0) (1.294) (528.6) (14.09) 
 0.461 0.571 0.523 0.648 
_IYEAR_2004 2,961*** 0.188 3,084*** 28.56* 
 (542.3) (1.658) (590.2) (15.21) 
 6.58e-05 0.911 0.000103 0.0800 
_IYEAR_2005 2,667*** 1.313 2,777*** 27.56 
 (468.6) (1.988) (491.3) (16.62) 
 4.27e-05 0.519 4.60e-05 0.118 
_IYEAR_2006 2,194*** 1.875 2,335*** 35.78* 
 (377.5) (2.229) (408.9) (17.20) 
 3.42e-05 0.414 4.13e-05 0.0550 
_IYEAR_2007 1,595*** 5.563 1,815*** 58** 
 (338.9) (3.215) (362.2) (21.82) 
 0.000282 0.104 0.000155 0.0179 
_IYEAR_2008 1,394*** 6.625* 1,656*** 70.13** 
 (340.2) (3.521) (377.0) (23.88) 
 0.000953 0.0794 0.000523 0.0102 
_IYEAR_2009 -186.5 4.188 72.94 50.75** 
 (485.1) (3.070) (468.1) (20.26) 
 0.706 0.193 0.878 0.0242 
_IYEAR_2010 -651.8 6.750* -297.9 68.38** 
 (470.3) (3.366) (436.5) (23.34) 
 0.186 0.0633 0.505 0.0104 
_IYEAR_2011 -1,195* 9.688** -723.8 86.25*** 
 (629.6) (4.316) (555.1) (27.45) 
 0.0770 0.0403 0.212 0.00671 
CONSTANT 92,205*** 138.2*** 101,418*** 1,767*** 
 (243.8) (2.167) (271.2) (16.79) 
 0 0 0 0 
ADJUSTED R-
SQUARED 
0.999 0.993 0.999 0.998 





















Figure A 1: Treatment and Control Group Averages Combined 
The graphs below present the average number of stores by category in the treatment and control groups. The 
number of stores can be found in Table A2. With theses graphs, we are looking for similar trends in the two groups 
before deregulation and then a change in the treatment group’s trend after deregulation. Recession years are 




































































































































































































   


























































































Table A 1: Shopping hour deregulation in Germany (Reddy, 2012) 





BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG 3/6/2007 7261 3053 M-Sa 0-24, Sundays 5 hrs x 3 
BAVARIA 6/1/2003 4209 0 M-Sa 6-20 
BERLIN 11/15/2006 7336 3128 M-Sa 0-24, Sundays 7 hrs x 6 
BRANDENBURG 11/29/2006 7316 3107 M-Sa 0-24, Sundays 7 hrs x 6 
BREMEN 4/1/2007 7314 3106 M-Sa 0-24, Sundays 5 hrs x 4 
HAMBURG 1/1/2007 7314 3106 M-Sa 0-24, Sundays 5 hrs x 4 
HESSE 12/1/2006 7294 3086 M-Sa 0-24, Sundays 6 hrs x 4 
LOWER SAXONY 4/1/2007 7294 3086 M-Sa 0-24 
MECKLENBURG- 
WESTERN POMERANIA 
7/2/2007 7177 2969 M-Fri 0-24, Sa 0-22, 0-24 (4x), 
Sundays 5 hrs x 4 
NORTH RHINE-
WESTPHALIA 
11/21/2006 7250 3041 M-Sa 0-24 
RHINELAND-
PALATINATE 
11/29/2006 4856 647 M-Sa 6-22, Sundays 5 hrs x 4 
SAARLAND 11/15/2006 4240 31 M-Sa 6-20, Sundays 5 hrs x 4, 
weekday 6-24 (1x) 
SAXONY-ANHALT 11/30/2006 7029 2820 M-Fri 0-24, Sa 0-20 
SAXONY 4/1/2007 5865 1656 M-Sa 6-22, Sundays 6 hrs x 4, 
weekdays 0-24 (5) 
SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN 12/1/2006 7294 3086 M-Sa 0-24 
THURINGIA 11/24/2006 7049 2840 M-Fri 0-24, Sa 0-20 
 Notes:  
- There is some year-to-year variation in the number of opening hours based on the different holidays celebrated 
in each state, which may fall on workdays. These figures incorporate that possibility (p.54). 





























2002 91070 9208 1557 134 8487 540441 10661320 
BADEN-
WÜRTTEMBERG 
2003 89575 8919 1553 130 9418 525218 10692556 
BADEN-
WÜRTTEMBERG 
2004 96240 9051 1595 135 11591 522252 10717419 
BADEN-
WÜRTTEMBERG 
2005 95908 9091 1611 135 13403 519742 10735701 
BADEN-
WÜRTTEMBERG 
2006 94953.5 9238 1641.5 137.5 15061 526933 10738753 
BADEN-
WÜRTTEMBERG 
2007 93993 9391 1720 149 15620 536538 10749755 
BADEN-
WÜRTTEMBERG 
2008 94587 9626 1725 153 15432 553053 10749506 
BADEN-
WÜRTTEMBERG 
2009 92423 9646 1725 142 16746 543720 10744921 
BADEN-
WÜRTTEMBERG 
2010 91203 9809 1756 147 17151 550071 10753880 
BADEN-
WÜRTTEMBERG 
2011 90523 10095 1800 155 15527 563439 10786227 
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BAVARIA 2002 123628 10863 1830 172 10112 667636 12387351 
BAVARIA 2003 119977 10781 1808 168 11847 648514 12423386 
BAVARIA 2004 127739 11050 1862 175 13522 645379 12443893 
BAVARIA 2005 127906 11182 1853 188 15521 645956 12468726 
BAVARIA 2006 126700.5 11334 1886.5 186 18276 643856 12492658 
BAVARIA 2007 125444 11467 1931 207 18801 651640 12520332 
BAVARIA 2008 125162 11732 1965 212 17656 673033 12519728 
BAVARIA 2009 121069 11734 1933 212 18169 666698 12510331 
BAVARIA 2010 121278 12100 1954 213 19001 677698 12538696 
BAVARIA 2011 119714 12378 2047 217 17895 695415 12595891 
BERLIN 2002 21813 1498 334 59 4450 139993 3392425 
BERLIN 2003 22237 1482 314 58 5420 134011 3388477 
BERLIN 2004 25866 1613 324 54 6001 127942 3387828 
BERLIN 2005 25971 1663 325 57 6794 127545 3395189 
BERLIN 2006 25423 1703 351 52 8460 128577 3404037 
BERLIN 2007 25473 1677 376 51 9206 132712 3416255 
BERLIN 2008 25634 1692 391 56 7326 136561 3431675 
BERLIN 2009 24868 1722 381 57 7748 135289 3442675 
BERLIN 2010 24348 1802 392 58 7910 139274 3460725 
BERLIN 2011 24562 1857 388 61 7656 144627 3501872 
BRANDENBURG 2002 19124 2113 248 12 3276 103754 2582379 
BRANDENBURG 2003 18961 2031 244 7 3378 100849 2574521 
BRANDENBURG 2004 21719 2083 246 9 4185 101229 2567704 
BRANDENBURG 2005 21752 2056 256 9 4903 99900 2559483 
BRANDENBURG 2006 21535 2069 254 9 6020 100493 2547772 
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BRANDENBURG 2007 21042 2098 250 9 6776 100886 2535737 
BRANDENBURG 2008 21008 2108 254 10 5980 101929 2522493 
BRANDENBURG 2009 20336 2101 259 8 6287 99887 2511525 
BRANDENBURG 2010 19828 2103 267 11 6130 101964 2503273 
BRANDENBURG 2011 20025 2170 268 12 5759 104950 2495635 
BREMEN 2002 4948 622 126 11 1309 42555 662098 
BREMEN 2003 4914 594 123 10 1216 41578 663129 
BREMEN 2004 5591 611 129 12 1527 40866 663213 
BREMEN 2005 5522 605 131 12 1791 40076 663467 
BREMEN 2006 5450.5 594 138 11.5 2726 39860 663979 
BREMEN 2007 5342 605 136 14 1800 39876 663082 
BREMEN 2008 5322 640 142 12 1835 40591 661866 
BREMEN 2009 5149 639 134 12 2150 39637 661716 
BREMEN 2010 5071 638 143 13 2260 39828 660706 
BREMEN 2011 4957 633 150 14 2161 40444 661301 
HAMBURG 2002 17643 1527 292 67 2199 136090 1728806 
HAMBURG 2003 17921 1594 323 70 2717 132409 1734083 
HAMBURG 2004 18813 1621 328 72 2947 130696 1734830 
HAMBURG 2005 18446 1622 326 68 3455 129708 1743627 
HAMBURG 2006 18486.5 1604 328 80 3929 127392 1754182 
HAMBURG 2007 17989 1649 331 82 4110 131481 1770629 
HAMBURG 2008 17779 1673 347 84 3919 133388 1772100 
HAMBURG 2009 17198 1633 345 83 4346 134193 1774224 
HAMBURG 2010 16545 1639 361 83 4530 136198 1786448 
HAMBURG 2011 16467 1654 359 85 4503 140011 1798836 
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HESSE 2002 54408 5388 993 96 5122 331938 6091618 
HESSE 2003 53238 5121 944 93 6477 320483 6089428 
HESSE 2004 58353 5350 983 101 7530 318965 6097765 
HESSE 2005 58188 5371 967 106 8708 316397 6092354 
HESSE 2006 57732.5 5356.5 975 102.5 10475 312666 6075359 
HESSE 2007 57184 5381 1006 107 11006 316850 6072555 
HESSE 2008 55933 5306 976 101 10947 322078 6064953 
HESSE 2009 54134 5366 946 94 11486 317566 6061951 
HESSE 2010 52972 5472 974 98 11994 321598 6067021 
HESSE 2011 52371 5553 1008 101 11350 330302 6092126 
LOWER SAXONY 2002 66567 7198 1163 72 9136 388483 7980472 
LOWER SAXONY 2003 65689 7007 1132 72 11395 377793 7993415 
LOWER SAXONY 2004 70051 7300 1168 61 14197 372522 8000909 
LOWER SAXONY 2005 69993 7180 1152 58 16782 368736 7993946 
LOWER SAXONY 2006 69154.5 7253.5 1180 57 19579 370809 7982685 
LOWER SAXONY 2007 68398 7438 1177 66 20191 377325 7971684 
LOWER SAXONY 2008 68174 7537 1222 76 19683 382921 7947244 
LOWER SAXONY 2009 65518 7626 1193 74 20002 381675 7928815 
LOWER SAXONY 2010 64284 7787 1202 76 20600 388758 7918293 












































2011 13141 1526 169 4 3249 69263 1634734 
NORTH RHINE-
WESTPHALIA 
2002 153967 14618 2746 275 17394 959545 18076355 
NORTH RHINE-
WESTPHALIA 
2003 150427 14473 2772 274 22787 925488 18079686 
NORTH RHINE-
WESTPHALIA 
2004 161399 15039 2828 287 26980 911567 18075352 
NORTH RHINE-
WESTPHALIA 
2005 160067 14821 2820 285 29418 907972 18058105 
NORTH RHINE-
WESTPHALIA 
2006 158682 14803 2805.5 292 35018 913071 18028745 
NORTH RHINE-
WESTPHALIA 
2007 157590 15195 2905 299 36538 924286 17996621 
NORTH RHINE-
WESTPHALIA 
2008 156416 15306 2940 303 35453 928606 17933064 
NORTH RHINE-
WESTPHALIA 
2009 149254 15066 2814 285 37501 918334 17872763 
NORTH RHINE-
WESTPHALIA 
2010 149013 15553 2904 302 39786 923749 17845154 
NORTH RHINE-
WESTPHALIA 
2011 146755 15950 2926 322 38625 945715 17841956 
RHINELAND-
PALATINATE 





2003 39098 3130 464 41 4789 176674 4058682 
RHINELAND-
PALATINATE 
2004 40700 3243 497 37 5476 174750 4061105 
RHINELAND-
PALATINATE 
2005 38414 3262 515 37 6573 174738 4058843 
RHINELAND-
PALATINATE 
2006 38153 3286.5 528.5 32 7329 175415 4052860 
RHINELAND-
PALATINATE 
2007 36495 3343 535 34 7379 177382 4045643 
RHINELAND-
PALATINATE 
2008 36695 3375 543 34 7100 178634 4028351 
RHINELAND-
PALATINATE 
2009 35542 3431 523 34 7519 177034 4012675 
RHINELAND-
PALATINATE 
2010 35490 3443 537 38 8036 179054 4003745 
RHINELAND-
PALATINATE 
2011 34469 3570 538 38 7329 181350 3999117 
SAARLAND 2002 9362 871 138 19 1276 55080 1064988 
SAARLAND 2003 9331 881 147 18 1760 53489 1061376 
SAARLAND 2004 9750 887 154 18 1938 52981 1056417 
SAARLAND 2005 9810 883 156 19 2208 52727 1050293 
SAARLAND 2006 9754 899.5 158.5 18 2808 52475 1043167 
SAARLAND 2007 9588 899 149 18 2528 52745 1036598 
SAARLAND 2008 9499 887 143 17 2367 53008 1030324 
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SAARLAND 2009 9188 901 146 18 2517 52175 1022585 
SAARLAND 2010 8874 894 148 20 2391 52760 1017567 
SAARLAND 2011 8528 926 152 18 2446 53869 1013352 
SAXONY 2002 32343 3347 504 28 4957 187815 4349059 
SAXONY 2003 33469 3285 505 23 5629 182751 4321437 
SAXONY 2004 35786 3279 511 20 6523 178353 4296284 
SAXONY 2005 35668 3219 493 22 8244 176054 4273754 
SAXONY 2006 35315.5 3248 487 22 9106 175455 4249774 
SAXONY 2007 34700 3317 510 22 9323 176453 4220200 
SAXONY 2008 34670 3269 530 20 8384 181407 4192801 
SAXONY 2009 33528 3278 518 19 8631 179400 4168732 
SAXONY 2010 33108 3337 516 23 8712 181853 4149477 
SAXONY 2011 33194 3460 528 23 7764 187239 4137051 
SAXONY-ANHALT 2002 18045 1814 233 8 3704 104632 2548911 
SAXONY-ANHALT 2003 17886 1817 249 9 3617 101895 2522941 
SAXONY-ANHALT 2004 19437 1904 261 7 4280 99047 2494437 
SAXONY-ANHALT 2005 19078 1832 245 8 5260 96689 2469716 
SAXONY-ANHALT 2006 18565 1858.5 260 9 6308 97434 2441787 
SAXONY-ANHALT 2007 17890 1879 251 10 6326 97160 2412472 
SAXONY-ANHALT 2008 17628 1858 261 10 5325 97739 2381872 
SAXONY-ANHALT 2009 17044 1863 263 9 5402 97471 2356219 
SAXONY-ANHALT 2010 16674 1834 268 9 5098 98427 2335006 
SAXONY-ANHALT 2011 16169 1885 266 10 4886 100610 2313280 
SCHLESWIG-
HOLSTEIN 





2003 26141 2722 443 30 4507 145875 2823171 
SCHLESWIG-
HOLSTEIN 
2004 26803 2708 455 30 4984 143304 2828760 
SCHLESWIG-
HOLSTEIN 
2005 26809 2723 455 32 5788 144105 2832950 
SCHLESWIG-
HOLSTEIN 
2006 26663 2747 445.5 33.5 7315 146073 2834254 
SCHLESWIG-
HOLSTEIN 
2007 26297 2875 452 34 7181 148086 2837373 
SCHLESWIG-
HOLSTEIN 
2008 26016 2895 459 31 6671 149384 2834260 
SCHLESWIG-
HOLSTEIN 
2009 25198 2906 457 32 6976 148662 2832027 
SCHLESWIG-
HOLSTEIN 
2010 24829 2960 459 30 7287 148975 2834259 
SCHLESWIG-
HOLSTEIN 
2011 24293 3058 461 32 6803 152530 2837641 
THURINGIA 2002 18925 1863 200 12 2662 99128 2392040 
THURINGIA 2003 18767 1795 211 8 2970 95455 2373157 
THURINGIA 2004 20543 1839 219 9 3180 92672 2355280 
THURINGIA 2005 20592 1800 223 10 3869 91351 2334575 
THURINGIA 2006 20216 1831 217 12 4767 91670 2311140 
THURINGIA 2007 19846 1879 218 11 4580 91786 2289219 
THURINGIA 2008 19522 1870 227 11 4012 94128 2267763 
61 
  
THURINGIA 2009 18652 1813 213 13 4274 92228 2249882 
THURINGIA 2010 18400 1865 210 11 4200 92373 2235025 


















WZ-G 95749 9255 1635 135 
BADEN-
WÜRTTEMBERG 
avg 94953.5 9238 1641.5 137.5 
BADEN-
WÜRTTEMBERG 
WZ08-G 94158 9221 1648 140 
BAVARIA WZ-G 128229 11432 1909 188 
BAVARIA avg 126700.5 11334 1886.5 186 
BAVARIA WZ08-G 125172 11236 1864 184 
BERLIN WZ-G 25736 1714 352 52 
BERLIN avg 25423 1703 351 52 
BERLIN WZ08-G 25110 1692 350 52 
BRANDENBURG WZ-G 21730 2074 254 9 
BRANDENBURG avg 21535 2069 254 9 
BRANDENBURG WZ08-G 21340 2064 254 9 
BREMEN WZ-G 5501 597 138 12 
BREMEN avg 5450.5 594 138 11.5 
BREMEN WZ08-G 5400 591 138 11 
HAMBURG WZ-G 18626 1611 329 81 
HAMBURG avg 18486.5 1604 328 80 
HAMBURG WZ08-G 18347 1597 327 79 
HESSE WZ-G 58008 5387 983 102 
HESSE avg 57732.5 5356.5 975 102.5 
HESSE WZ08-G 57457 5326 967 103 
LOWER 
SAXONY 
WZ-G 69791 7281 1182 57 
LOWER 
SAXONY 
avg 69154.5 7253.5 1180 57 
LOWER 
SAXONY 




WZ-G 14218 1520 154 4 
                                                          
9 Starting with 2006, the Statistisches Bundesamt slightly adjusted its calculation method; thus, the variable was 











WZ08-G 13842 1497 151 4 
NORTH RHINE-
WESTPHALIA 
WZ-G 159452 14823 2800 290 
NORTH RHINE-
WESTPHALIA 
avg 158682 14803 2805.5 292 
NORTH RHINE-
WESTPHALIA 
WZ08-G 157912 14783 2811 294 
RHINELAND-
PALATINATE 
WZ-G 38471 3297 531 32 
RHINELAND-
PALATINATE 
avg 38153 3286.5 528.5 32 
RHINELAND-
PALATINATE 
WZ08-G 37835 3276 526 32 
SAARLAND WZ-G 9826 903 159 18 
SAARLAND avg 9754 899.5 158.5 18 
SAARLAND WZ08-G 9682 896 158 18 
SAXONY-
ANHALT 
WZ-G 18830 1861 260 9 
SAXONY-
ANHALT 
avg 18565 1858.5 260 9 
SAXONY-
ANHALT 
WZ08-G 18300 1856 260 9 
SAXONY  WZ-G 35652 3260 488 22 
SAXONY  avg 35315.5 3248 487 22 
SAXONY  WZ08-G 34979 3236 486 22 
SCHLESWIG-
HOLSTEIN 
WZ-G 26743 2764 447 34 
SCHLESWIG-
HOLSTEIN 
avg 26663 2747 445.5 33.5 
SCHLESWIG-
HOLSTEIN 
WZ08-G 26583 2730 444 33 
THURINGIA WZ-G 20389 1837 217 12 
THURINGIA avg 20216 1831 217 12 





Table A 3: Percentage Change in German Retail Businesses by Size (from Statistisches Bundesamt)  
BUSINESS SIZE BY NUMBER 
OF EMPLOYEES 
 0-9 10-49 50-249 250+   
 Baden-Württemberg YEAR-TO-YEAR CHANGES  
2002-2003 -0.01642 -0.03139 -0.00257 -0.02985 
2003-2004 0.074407 0.0148 0.027044 0.038462 
2004-2005 -0.00345 0.004419 0.010031 0 
2005-2006 -0.00995 0.01617 0.018932 0.018519 
2006-2007 -0.01012 0.016562 0.047822 0.083636 
2007-2008 0.00632 0.025024 0.002907 0.026846 
2008-2009 -0.02288 0.002078 0 -0.0719 
2009-2010 -0.0132 0.016898 0.017971 0.035211 
2010-2011 -0.00746 0.029157 0.025057 0.054422 
 Bavaria YEAR-TO-YEAR CHANGES  
2002-2003 -0.02953 -0.00755 -0.01202 -0.02326 
2003-2004 0.064696 0.024951 0.029867 0.041667 
2004-2005 0.001307 0.011946 -0.00483 0.074286 
2005-2006 -0.00942 0.013593 0.018079 -0.01064 
2006-2007 -0.00992 0.011735 0.023589 0.112903 
2007-2008 -0.00225 0.02311 0.017607 0.024155 
2008-2009 -0.0327 0.00017 -0.01628 0 
2009-2010 0.001726 0.031191 0.010864 0.004717 
2010-2011 -0.0129 0.022975 0.047595 0.018779 
 Berlin YEAR-TO-YEAR CHANGES    
2002-2003 0.019438 -0.01068 -0.05988 -0.01695 
2003-2004 0.163196 0.088394 0.031847 -0.06897 
2004-2005 0.004059 0.030998 0.003086 0.055556 
2005-2006 -0.0211 0.024053 0.08 -0.08772 
2006-2007 0.001967 -0.01527 0.071225 -0.01923 
2007-2008 0.00632 0.008945 0.039894 0.098039 
2008-2009 -0.02988 0.01773 -0.02558 0.017857 
2009-2010 -0.02091 0.046458 0.028871 0.017544 
2010-2011 0.008789 0.030522 -0.0102 0.051724 
 Brandenburg YEAR-TO-YEAR CHANGES  
2002-2003 -0.00852 -0.03881 -0.01613 -0.41667 
2003-2004 0.145456 0.025603 0.008197 0.285714 
2004-2005 0.001519 -0.01296 0.04065 0 
2005-2006 -0.00998 0.006323 -0.00781 0 
2006-2007 -0.02289 0.014016 -0.01575 0 
2007-2008 -0.00162 0.004766 0.016 0.111111 
65 
  
2008-2009 -0.03199 -0.00332 0.019685 -0.2 
2009-2010 -0.02498 0.000952 0.030888 0.375 
2010-2011 0.009935 0.031859 0.003745 0.090909 
 Bremen YEAR-TO-YEAR CHANGES  
2002-2003 -0.00687 -0.04502 -0.02381 -0.09091 
2003-2004 0.13777 0.02862 0.04878 0.2 
2004-2005 -0.01234 -0.00982 0.015504 0 
2005-2006 -0.01295 -0.01818 0.053435 -0.04167 
2006-2007 -0.01991 0.018519 -0.01449 0.217391 
2007-2008 -0.00374 0.057851 0.044118 -0.14286 
2008-2009 -0.03251 -0.00156 -0.05634 0 
2009-2010 -0.01515 -0.00156 0.067164 0.083333 
2010-2011 -0.02248 -0.00784 0.048951 0.076923 
 Hamburg YEAR-TO-YEAR CHANGES  
2002-2003 0.015757 0.043877 0.106164 0.044776 
2003-2004 0.049774 0.016939 0.01548 0.028571 
2004-2005 -0.01951 0.000617 -0.0061 -0.05556 
2005-2006 0.002196 -0.0111 0.006135 0.176471 
2006-2007 -0.02691 0.028055 0.009146 0.025 
2007-2008 -0.01167 0.014554 0.048338 0.02439 
2008-2009 -0.03268 -0.02391 -0.00576 -0.0119 
2009-2010 -0.03797 0.003674 0.046377 0 
2010-2011 -0.00471 0.009152 -0.00554 0.024096 
 Hesse YEAR-TO-YEAR CHANGES  
2002-2003 -0.0215 -0.04955 -0.04935 -0.03125 
2003-2004 0.096078 0.044718 0.041314 0.086022 
2004-2005 -0.00283 0.003925 -0.01628 0.049505 
2005-2006 -0.00783 -0.0027 0.008273 -0.03302 
2006-2007 -0.0095 0.004574 0.031795 0.043902 
2007-2008 -0.02188 -0.01394 -0.02982 -0.05607 
2008-2009 -0.03216 0.011308 -0.03074 -0.06931 
2009-2010 -0.02147 0.019754 0.029598 0.042553 
2010-2011 -0.01135 0.014803 0.034908 0.030612 
 Lower Saxony YEAR-TO-YEAR CHANGES  
2002-2003 -0.01319 -0.02654 -0.02666 0 
2003-2004 0.066404 0.041815 0.031802 -0.15278 
2004-2005 -0.00083 -0.01644 -0.0137 -0.04918 
2005-2006 -0.01198 0.010237 0.024306 -0.01724 
2006-2007 -0.01094 0.025436 -0.00254 0.157895 
2007-2008 -0.00327 0.01331 0.038233 0.151515 
66 
  
2008-2009 -0.03896 0.011808 -0.02373 -0.02632 
2009-2010 -0.01883 0.021112 0.007544 0.027027 
2010-2011 -0.01574 0.028766 0.009151 0.065789 
 Mecklenburg- Western Pomerania YEAR-TO-YEAR CHANGES  
2002-2003 0.028938 -0.00067 -0.01948 0 
2003-2004 0.142218 -0.01485 0.059603 -0.2 
2004-2005 -0.00238 0.040439 -0.0125 -0.25 
2005-2006 -0.01627 -0.00626 -0.03481 0.333333 
2006-2007 -0.00542 -0.00497 0.036066 0 
2007-2008 0.000573 0.003331 -0.00633 0 
2008-2009 -0.02414 -0.00266 0.025478 -0.25 
2009-2010 -0.01908 0 0 0.333333 
2010-2011 -0.01676 0.015979 0.049689 0 
 Northrhine-Westphalia YEAR-TO-YEAR CHANGES  
2002-2003 -0.02299 -0.00992 0.009468 -0.00364 
2003-2004 0.072939 0.039107 0.020202 0.047445 
2004-2005 -0.00825 -0.0145 -0.00283 -0.00697 
2005-2006 -0.00865 -0.00121 -0.00514 0.024561 
2006-2007 -0.00688 0.026481 0.035466 0.023973 
2007-2008 -0.00745 0.007305 0.012048 0.013378 
2008-2009 -0.04579 -0.01568 -0.04286 -0.05941 
2009-2010 -0.00161 0.032324 0.031983 0.059649 
2010-2011 -0.01515 0.025526 0.007576 0.066225 
 Rheinland-Palatinate YEAR-TO-YEAR CHANGES  
2002-2003 0.101973 0.624286 0.572881 0.576923 
2003-2004 0.040974 0.036102 0.071121 -0.09756 
2004-2005 -0.05617 0.005859 0.036217 0 
2005-2006 -0.00679 0.007511 0.026214 -0.13514 
2006-2007 -0.04346 0.017192 0.012299 0.0625 
2007-2008 0.00548 0.009572 0.014953 0 
2008-2009 -0.03142 0.016593 -0.03683 0 
2009-2010 -0.00146 0.003498 0.026769 0.117647 
2010-2011 -0.02877 0.036886 0.001862 0 
 Saarland YEAR-TO-YEAR CHANGES  
2002-2003 -0.00331 0.011481 0.065217 -0.05263 
2003-2004 0.044904 0.00681 0.047619 0 
2004-2005 0.006154 -0.00451 0.012987 0.055556 
2005-2006 -0.00571 0.018686 0.016026 -0.05263 
2006-2007 -0.01702 -0.00056 -0.05994 0 
2007-2008 -0.00928 -0.01335 -0.04027 -0.05556 
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2008-2009 -0.03274 0.015784 0.020979 0.058824 
2009-2010 -0.03418 -0.00777 0.013699 0.111111 
2010-2011 -0.03899 0.035794 0.027027 -0.1 
 Saxony YEAR-TO-YEAR CHANGES  
2002-2003 0.034814 -0.01852 0.001984 -0.17857 
2003-2004 0.069228 -0.00183 0.011881 -0.13043 
2004-2005 -0.0033 -0.0183 -0.03523 0.1 
2005-2006 -0.00988 0.009009 -0.01217 0 
2006-2007 -0.01743 0.021244 0.047228 0 
2007-2008 -0.00086 -0.01447 0.039216 -0.09091 
2008-2009 -0.03294 0.002753 -0.02264 -0.05 
2009-2010 -0.01253 0.017999 -0.00386 0.210526 
2010-2011 0.002598 0.036859 0.023256 0 
 Saxony-Anhalt YEAR-TO-YEAR CHANGES  
2002-2003 -0.00881 0.001654 0.06867 0.125 
2003-2004 0.086716 0.047881 0.048193 -0.22222 
2004-2005 -0.01847 -0.03782 -0.0613 0.142857 
2005-2006 -0.02689 0.014465 0.061224 0.125 
2006-2007 -0.03636 0.01103 -0.03462 0.111111 
2007-2008 -0.01465 -0.01118 0.039841 0 
2008-2009 -0.03313 0.002691 0.007663 -0.1 
2009-2010 -0.02171 -0.01557 0.019011 0 
2010-2011 -0.03029 0.027808 -0.00746 0.111111 
 Schleswig-Holstein YEAR-TO-YEAR CHANGES  
2002-2003 -0.00313 -0.00548 -0.02208 -0.0625 
2003-2004 0.025324 -0.00514 0.027088 0 
2004-2005 0.000224 0.005539 0 0.066667 
2005-2006 -0.00545 0.008814 -0.02088 0.046875 
2006-2007 -0.01373 0.046596 0.01459 0.014925 
2007-2008 -0.01069 0.006957 0.015487 -0.08824 
2008-2009 -0.03144 0.0038 -0.00436 0.032258 
2009-2010 -0.01464 0.018582 0.004376 -0.0625 
2010-2011 -0.02159 0.033108 0.004357 0.066667 
 Thuringia YEAR-TO-YEAR CHANGES  
2002-2003 -0.00835 -0.0365 0.055 -0.33333 
2003-2004 0.094634 0.024513 0.037915 0.125 
2004-2005 0.002385 -0.02121 0.018265 0.111111 
2005-2006 -0.01826 0.017222 -0.02691 0.2 
2006-2007 -0.0183 0.026215 0.004608 -0.08333 
2007-2008 -0.01633 -0.00479 0.041284 0 
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2008-2009 -0.04457 -0.03048 -0.06167 0.181818 
2009-2010 -0.01351 0.028682 -0.01408 -0.15385 
2010-2011 -0.01386 0.01555 0.038095 -0.09091 




Table A 4: Scale (0-1) Treatment Values for German States (Senftleben-König, 2014, p. 5) 

















BREMEN 0.7379 SAXONY 0.3935 
 













Table A 5: OLS Regression Model with Scale Treatment, No 2007 or 2008 
      DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 SMALL 
STORES 
LARGE STORES SMALL/MEDIUM MEDIUM/LARGE 
STORES 
INTX 766.2 -8.308 497.1 -26.80 
 (1,038) (6.678) (964.5) (27.01) 
P-VALUES 0.472 0.233 0.614 0.337 
BANKRUPTCIES -0.214*** 0.00169*** -0.154** 0.00901*** 
 (0.0571) (0.000530) (0.0559) (0.00202) 
P-VALUES 0.00190 0.00601 0.0145 0.000449 
RETAILEMP -0.127*** 0.000435*** -0.110*** 0.00280*** 
 (0.0225) (7.47e-05) (0.0238) (0.000716) 
P-VALUES 4.45e-05 3.40e-05 0.000330 0.00138 
STATEPOPULATION 0.0136*** 1.86e-05 0.0139*** 0.000160** 
 (0.00441) (1.83e-05) (0.00438) (6.30e-05) 
P-VALUES 0.00753 0.323 0.00627 0.0230 
ADJUSTED R-
SQUARED 0.999 0.996 0.999 0.999 




Table A 6: Stata Results, OLS, with Strict Definition of Treatment  
Saxony, Rhineland-Palatinate, Bavaria, and Saarland are not in the treatment group 
      DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 SMALL 
STORES 




INTX 385.3 -2.858 253.1 -15.52 
 (633.4) (3.880) (577.2) (13.18) 
P-VALUES 0.552 0.473 0.667 0.257 
BANKRUPTCIES -0.138** 0.00173*** -0.0809 0.00978*** 
 (0.0517) (0.000551) (0.0501) (0.00206) 
P-VALUES 0.0175 0.00677 0.127 0.000260 
RETAILEMP -0.115*** 0.000438*** -0.0983*** 0.00281*** 
 (0.0225) (6.56e-05) (0.0236) (0.000580) 
P-VALUES 0.000124 7.37e-06 0.000816 0.000216 
STATEPOPULATION 0.0134** 2.42e-05 0.0137** 0.000170** 
 (0.00493) (2.21e-05) (0.00484) (6.15e-05) 




0.999 0.996 0.999 0.999 




Table A 7: Stata Results, OLS, with Strict Definition of Treatment for W. German states 
Rhineland-Palatinate, Bavaria, and Saarland are not in the treatment group 
      DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 SMALL 
STORES 




INTX 495.2 -5.008 293.2 -24.65 
 (798.7) (4.847) (752.9) (20.21) 
P-VALUES 0.551 0.328 0.706 0.254 
BANKRUPTCIES 0.0300 0.00200** 0.0847 0.0111*** 
 (0.0826) (0.000690) (0.0784) (0.00294) 
P-VALUES 0.725 0.0178 0.308 0.00447 
RETAILEMP -0.115*** 0.000458*** -0.0964*** 0.00304*** 
 (0.0201) (7.76e-05) (0.0219) (0.000677) 
P-VALUES 0.000286 0.000229 0.00173 0.00150 
STATEPOPULATION 0.0231*** 4.00e-05 0.0230*** 0.000223 
 (0.00651) (3.06e-05) (0.00644) (0.000139) 
P-VALUES 0.00628 0.224 0.00594 0.143 
ADJUSTED R-
SQUARED 
 0.999 0.996 0.999 0.999 




Table A 8: Stata Results, OLS, with Less Strict Definition of Treatment  
Bavaria and Saarland are not in the treatment group 
      DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 SMALL 
STORES 




INTX 482.0 -7.408 404.9 0.992 
 (482.0) (5.681) (443.7) (14.42) 
P-VALUES 0.333 0.212 0.376 0.946 
BANKRUPTCIES -0.134** 0.00171*** -0.0784 0.00956*** 
 (0.0523) (0.000490) (0.0503) (0.00214) 
P-VALUES 0.0217 0.00333 0.140 0.000444 
RETAILEMP -0.115*** 0.000419*** -0.0976*** 0.00287*** 
 (0.0224) (6.66e-05) (0.0234) (0.000593) 
P-VALUES 0.000122 1.45e-05 0.000814 0.000221 
STATEPOPULATION 0.0138** 1.73e-05 0.0141** 0.000171** 
 (0.00491) (1.79e-05) (0.00489) (6.61e-05) 












Note: Includes state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table A 9: OLS Model for LARGE Stores with Strict Treatment with Modifications 






















INTX -2.858 -1.452 -3.717 -2.874 -4.049 -2.669 0.0424 
 (3.880) (4.983) (5.125) (4.454) (7.020) (8.005) (0.0424) 
P-VALUES 0.473 0.775 0.480 0.529 0.573 0.743 0.333 
BANKRUPT
CIES 
0.00173***  0.00179*** 0.00167*** 0.00167***  3.75e-06 
 (0.000551)  (0.000490) (0.000489) (0.000477)  (5.82e-06) 
P-VALUES 0.00677  0.00239 0.00386 0.00329  0.529 
RETAILEMP 0.000438*** 0.000463***  0.000505***   1.08e-06 
 (6.56e-05) (8.91e-05)  (0.000101)   (1.42e-06) 
P-VALUES 7.37e-06 0.000108  0.000163   0.459 
STATEPOP
ULATION 
2.42e-05 1.51e-05 4.67e-05    2.63e-07 
 (2.21e-05) (3.50e-05) (2.79e-05)    (2.93e-07) 




0.996 0.995 0.995 0.996 0.995 0.993 0.993 
Note: Includes state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table A 10: OLS Model for LARGE Stores with Less Strict Treatment with Modifications 






















INTX -7.408 -7.025 -8.947 -8.183 -11.23 -10.46 0.00662 
 (5.681) (7.949) (7.840) (6.256) (9.823) (12.02) (0.0463) 
P-VALUE 0.212 0.391 0.272 0.211 0.271 0.398 0.888 
BANKRUPTCIE
S 
0.00171***  0.00175*** 0.00167*** 0.00166***  4.31e-06 
 (0.000490)  (0.000419) (0.000443) (0.000399)  (5.51e-06) 







 0.000462***   9.55e-07 
 (6.66e-05) (9.41e-05)  (7.07e-05)   (1.45e-06) 
P-VALUE 1.45e-05 0.000299  9.34e-06   0.522 
STATEPOPULA
TION 
1.73e-05 8.62e-06 3.73e-05*    2.68e-07 
 (1.79e-05) (3.11e-05) (2.09e-05)    (3.00e-07) 
P-VALUE 0.349 0.785 0.0949    0.385 
ADJUSTED R-
SQUARED 
0.997 0.995 0.996 0.996 0.995 0.994 0.993 
Note: Includes state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A 11: OLS Model for SMALL Stores with Strict Treatment with Modifications 




















INTX 385.3 273.0 611.4 376.7 558.4 415.6 0.0134 
 (633.4) (689.7) (734.7) (555.7) (537.6) (685.5) (0.0137) 
P-VALUES 0.552 0.698 0.418 0.508 0.315 0.553 0.346 
BANKRUPT
CIES 
-0.138**  -0.153*** -0.173 -0.172**  -1.07e-06 
 (0.0517)  (0.0416) (0.104) (0.0590)  (1.86e-06) 
P-VALUES 0.0175  0.00221 0.119 0.0106  0.573 
RETAILEMP -0.115*** -0.117***  -0.0781**   9.69e-
07*** 
 (0.0225) (0.0194)  (0.0297)   (2.08e-07) 
P-VALUES 0.000124 2.26e-05  0.0190   0.000304 
STATEPOP
ULATION 
0.0134** 0.0141** 0.00745    3.28e-08 
 (0.00493) (0.00638) (0.00558)    (1.18e-07) 




0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
Note: Includes state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
77 
  
Table A 12: OLS Model for SMALL Stores with Scale Treatment with Modifications 




















INTX 901.6 737.1 1,304 648.0 1,048 826.0 0.0284 
 (783.0) (855.5) (1,069) (891.9) (832.3) (1,101) (0.0178) 
P-VALUES 0.268 0.402 0.241 0.479 0.227 0.465 0.132 
BANKRUPT
CIES 
-0.140**  -0.155*** -0.173 -0.173**  -1.10e-06 
 (0.0518)  (0.0412) (0.104) (0.0595)  (1.83e-06) 
P-VALUES 0.0166  0.00193 0.118 0.0107  0.556 
RETAILEMP -0.115*** -0.117***  -0.0774**   9.92e-
07*** 
 (0.0227) (0.0195)  (0.0303)   (2.15e-07) 
P-VALUES 0.000145 2.55e-05  0.0221   0.000337 
STATEPOP
ULATION 
0.0136** 0.0143** 0.00781    3.94e-08 
 (0.00492) (0.00637) (0.00532)    (1.17e-07) 




0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
Note: Includes state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table A 13: OLS Model for SMALL Stores with Less Strict Treatment with Modifications 




















INTX 482.0 452.0 904.0 -135.6 393.9 317.3 0.0117 
 (482.0) (582.5) (953.7) (460.3) (607.6) (835.6) (0.0114) 
P-VALUES 0.333 0.450 0.358 0.772 0.527 0.709 0.321 
BANKRUPT
CIES 
-0.134**  -0.147*** -0.167 -0.167**  -9.14e-07 
 (0.0523)  (0.0412) (0.104) (0.0595)  (1.82e-06) 
P-VALUES 0.0217  0.00285 0.131 0.0135  0.623 
RETAILEMP -0.115*** -0.117***  -0.0804**   9.68e-
07*** 
 (0.0224) (0.0193)  (0.0307)   (1.87e-07) 
P-VALUES 0.000122 2.31e-05  0.0194   0.000114 
STATEPOP
ULATION 
0.0138** 0.0145** 0.00835    4.34e-08 
 (0.00491) (0.00636) (0.00530)    (1.21e-07) 




0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
Note: Includes state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table A 14: OLS Model for SMALL & MEDIUM Stores with Strict Treatment with Modifications 




















INTX 253.1 187.3 445.8 244.3 384.0 287.8 0.0113 
 (577.2) (607.0) (650.0) (517.6) (446.4) (541.8) (0.0117) 
P-VALUES 0.667 0.762 0.503 0.644 0.403 0.603 0.350 
BANKRUPT
CIES 
-0.0809  -0.0938** -0.116 -0.116  -7.74e-07 
 (0.0501)  (0.0403) (0.104) (0.0686)  (1.67e-06) 
P-VALUES 0.127  0.0344 0.282 0.111  0.650 
RETAILEMP -0.0983*** -0.0995***  -0.0601*   9.59e-07*** 
 (0.0236) (0.0217)  (0.0308)   (1.97e-07) 
P-VALUES 0.000816 0.000366  0.0700   0.000205 
STATEPOP
ULATION 
0.0137** 0.0142** 0.00867    4.39e-08 
 (0.00484) (0.00568) (0.00518)    (1.10e-07) 




0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 




Table A 15: OLS Model for SMALL & MEDIUM Stores with Scale Treatment with Modifications 


















INTX 673.6 576.3 1,016 414.7 723.1 573.2 0.0248 
 (711.0) (741.5) (920.4) (844.3) (687.7) (851.9) (0.0152) 
P-VALUES 0.358 0.449 0.287 0.630 0.310 0.511 0.123 
BANKRUPT
CIES 
-0.0826  -0.0953** -0.116 -0.117  -8.10e-07 
 (0.0504)  (0.0402) (0.104) (0.0691)  (1.64e-06) 
P-VALUES 0.122  0.0315 0.281 0.111  0.629 
RETAILEMP -0.0975*** -0.0987***  -0.0596*   9.81e-07*** 
 (0.0237) (0.0218)  (0.0313)   (1.98e-07) 
P-VALUES 0.000909 0.000395  0.0761   0.000174 
STATEPOP
ULATION 
0.0139** 0.0143** 0.00896*    4.98e-08 
 (0.00487) (0.00571) (0.00500)    (1.09e-07) 




0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 




Table A 16: OLS Model for SMALL & MEDIUM Stores with Less Strict Treatment with Modifications 



















INTX 404.9 387.3 763.5 -224.9 186.5 135.1 0.0126 
 (443.7) (487.4) (810.8) (471.2) (432.9) (576.3) (0.0105) 
P-VALUES 0.376 0.439 0.361 0.640 0.673 0.818 0.249 
BANKRUPT
CIES 
-0.0784  -0.0892** -0.112 -0.112  -6.49e-07 
 (0.0503)  (0.0394) (0.104) (0.0685)  (1.62e-06) 
P-VALUES 0.140  0.0388 0.299 0.123  0.695 
RETAILEMP -0.0976*** -0.0986***  -0.0624*   9.69e-
07*** 
 (0.0234) (0.0215)  (0.0316)   (1.81e-07) 
P-VALUES 0.000814 0.000362  0.0666   8.26e-05 
STATEPOP
ULATION 
0.0141** 0.0145** 0.00944*    5.54e-08 
 (0.00489) (0.00573) (0.00501)    (1.13e-07) 




0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
Note: Includes state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A 17: OLS Model for MEDIUM & LARGE Stores with Strict Treatment with Modifications 





















INTX -15.52 -7.574 -21.02 -15.63 -23.26 -15.53 0.00137 
 (13.18) (19.30) (18.34) (14.62) (27.33) (34.76) (0.0353) 
P-VALUES 0.257 0.700 0.270 0.302 0.408 0.661 0.969 
BANKRUPT
CIES 
0.00978***  0.0101*** 0.00934*** 0.00933***  -2.16e-06 
 (0.00206)  (0.00185) (0.00166) (0.00244)  (2.40e-06) 
P-VALUES 0.000260  6.38e-05 4.87e-05 0.00168  0.382 
RETAILEMP 0.00281*** 0.00295***  0.00328***   1.10e-06 
 (0.000580) (0.000842)  (0.000728)   (6.88e-07) 
P-VALUES 0.000216 0.00324  0.000416   0.132 
STATEPOP
ULATION 
0.000170** 0.000119 0.000315**    1.74e-07 
 (6.15e-05) (0.000125) (0.000113)    (1.08e-07) 




0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.998 0.998 0.997 
Note: Includes state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table A 18: OLS Model for MEDIUM & LARGE Stores with Scale Treatment with Modifications 




















INTX -23.66 -12.17 -33.51 -26.72 -43.54 -31.52 0.0156 
 (23.25) (33.62) (34.44) (24.25) (47.40) (61.61) (0.0572) 
P-VALUE 0.325 0.722 0.346 0.288 0.373 0.616 0.789 
BANKRUPT
CIES 
0.00975***  0.0101*** 0.00934*** 0.00937***  -2.26e-06 
 (0.00203)  (0.00182) (0.00165) (0.00242)  (2.41e-06) 
P-VALUE 0.000230  5.58e-05 4.50e-05 0.00151  0.364 
RETAILEMP 0.00280*** 0.00294***  0.00325***   1.13e-06 
 (0.000590) (0.000855)  (0.000734)   (6.64e-07) 
P-VALUE 0.000258 0.00364  0.000488   0.109 
STATEPOP
ULATION 
0.000165** 0.000116 0.000306**    1.78e-07 
 -23.66 (0.000123) (0.000112)    (1.07e-07) 




0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.998 0.998 0.997 




Table A 19: OLS Model for MEDIUM & LARGE Stores with Less Strict Treatment with Modifications 





















INTX 0.992 3.139 -9.537 -6.659 -28.36 -24.15 0.0572** 
 (14.42) (26.89) (29.55) (17.91) (42.33) (54.82) (0.0234) 
P-VALUES 0.946 0.909 0.751 0.715 0.513 0.666 0.0276 
BANKRUPT
CIES 
0.00956***  0.00988*** 0.00916*** 0.00915***  -2.27e-06 
 (0.00214)  (0.00195) (0.00176) (0.00247)  (2.63e-06) 
P-VALUES 0.000444  0.000136 0.000109 0.00213  0.403 
RETAILEMP 0.00287*** 0.00299***  0.00329***   1.32e-06* 
 (0.000593) (0.000885)  (0.000755)   (6.72e-07) 
P-VALUES 0.000221 0.00419  0.000559   0.0682 
STATEPOP
ULATION 
0.000171** 0.000122 0.000308**    2.27e-07** 
 (6.61e-05) (0.000128) (0.000120)    (9.86e-08) 




0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.998 0.998 0.997 
Note: Includes state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table A 20: OLS Model for Stores with Strict Treatment, Regressing Other Variables  
     DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 BANKRUPTCIES RETAIL EMPLOYMENT 
INTX 828.3 -2,328 
 (1,192) (5,341) 
P-VALUES 0.498 0.669 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED 0.943 0.999 
Note: Includes state and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
86 
  
Table A 21: OLS Model for Stores with Less Strict Treatment, Regressing Other Variables  
     DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 BANKRUPTCIES RETAIL EMPLOYMENT 
INTX 460.3 -6,591 
 (1,555) (8,158) 
P-VALUES 0.771 0.432 
ADJUSTED R-SQUARED 0.942 0.999 




Table A 22: Summary Statistics, Scaled Treatment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
            
YEAR 176 2,007 3.171 2,002 2,012 
STORES_09EMPLOYEES 160 44,950 42,473 4,914 161,399 
STORES_1049EMPLOYEES 160 4,387 4,149 594 15,950 
STORES_50249EMPLOYEES 160 743.8 762.1 123 2,940 
STORES_250EMPLOYEES 160 67.79 78.63 3 322 
BANKRUPTCIES 176 8,877 8,017 1,216 39,786 
RETAILEMP 176 254,588 247,140 39,637 959,545 
VATREVENUE 80 1.036e+08 1.244e+08 8.499e+06 4.785e+08 
STATEPOPULATION 176 5.128e+06 4.697e+06 654,774 1.808e+07 
T_B 176 0.875 0.332 0 1 
A_B 176 0.310 0.348 0 0.743 
INTX 176 0.310 0.348 0 0.743 
STORES_S_M 160 49,336 46,594 5,508 176,438 
STORES_M_L 160 811.6 838.1 133 3,248 
SMALL_LOG 160 10.31 0.907 8.500 11.99 
LARGE_LOG 160 3.548 1.216 1.099 5.775 
SM_LOG 160 10.40 0.905 8.614 12.08 
ML_LOG 160 6.241 0.940 4.890 8.086 
_ISTATE_2 176 0.0625 0.243 0 1 
_ISTATE_3 176 0.0625 0.243 0 1 
_ISTATE_4 176 0.0625 0.243 0 1 
_ISTATE_5 176 0.0625 0.243 0 1 
_ISTATE_6 176 0.0625 0.243 0 1 
_ISTATE_7 176 0.0625 0.243 0 1 
_ISTATE_8 176 0.0625 0.243 0 1 
_ISTATE_9 176 0.0625 0.243 0 1 
_ISTATE_10 176 0.0625 0.243 0 1 
_ISTATE_11 176 0.0625 0.243 0 1 
_ISTATE_12 176 0.0625 0.243 0 1 
_ISTATE_13 176 0.0625 0.243 0 1 
_ISTATE_14 176 0.0625 0.243 0 1 
_ISTATE_15 176 0.0625 0.243 0 1 
_ISTATE_16 176 0.0625 0.243 0 1 
_IYEAR_2003 176 0.0909 0.288 0 1 
_IYEAR_2004 176 0.0909 0.288 0 1 
_IYEAR_2005 176 0.0909 0.288 0 1 
_IYEAR_2006 176 0.0909 0.288 0 1 
_IYEAR_2007 176 0.0909 0.288 0 1 
_IYEAR_2008 176 0.0909 0.288 0 1 
_IYEAR_2009 176 0.0909 0.288 0 1 
_IYEAR_2010 176 0.0909 0.288 0 1 
_IYEAR_2011 176 0.0909 0.288 0 1 
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